Mirages affair
| Date | 1961–1964 |
|---|---|
| Location | Switzerland |
| Outcome | Reduction of aircraft order, parliamentary inquiry, political resignations, regulatory changes |
The Mirage Affair was a major political and military procurement scandal in Switzerland in 1964, involving significant cost overruns in the acquisition of Mirage fighter aircraft. The affair led to the creation of Switzerland's first parliamentary inquiry committee and resulted in the resignation of senior military officials and a Federal Councillor.
Background
On 21 June 1961, the Federal Assembly voted to acquire 100 Mirage combat aircraft for the Swiss Air Force and approved a credit of 871 million Swiss francs for this purpose.[1]
Cost overruns and parliamentary inquiry
On 4 May 1964, the Federal Council requested an additional credit of 356 million francs, along with 220 million for cost increases. The announcement caused considerable surprise among the public. Parliament had not been informed of all costs, which had been increased by the decision to build the Mirages under license in Switzerland, equip them with enhancements (such as the choice of electronics), and make them capable of various missions (multi-role capability).[1]
Parliament, feeling it had been deceived, refused to consider the matter and on 17 June 1964 created the first parliamentary inquiry committee in its history, following a proposal by National Councillor Kurt Furgler, who became its president. The report delivered on 1 September was damning: the Military Department was accused of having deceived the government, the legislature, and public opinion. On 24 September, the Chambers reduced the number of aircraft from 100 to 57. In the end, there were only 36 fighter aircraft, as the desired multi-role capability proved impossible; 12 aircraft were assigned to reconnaissance and the others to pilot training.[1]
Consequences
Those responsible were sanctioned. Divisionnaire Etienne Primault, chief of aviation, was suspended and the chief of the general staff, Jakob Annasohn, was dismissed from his functions. The head of the Military Department, Paul Chaudet, whose resignation had been demanded by several parliamentarians, chose not to seek a new term in 1966. From a military perspective, the affair called into question the defence concept chosen in 1961.[1]
To prevent such a situation from recurring, parliamentary oversight was strengthened (for example, through the creation of the Documentation Service of the Federal Assembly) and the Military Department was given the organizational and expertise resources necessary for the preparation of such projects.[1]
See also
References
This article incorporates text from a free content work. Licensed under CC-BY SA. Text taken from Mirages, affaire des, Paolo Urio, Historical Dictionary of Switzerland.
Bibliography
- Geiger, Willi: "Der Mirage-Konflikt. Seine Entstehung, Lösung und grundsätzliche Bedeutung", in: Annuaire suisse de science politique, 5, 1965, pp. 90–99.
- Urio, Paolo: L'affaire des Mirages. Décision administrative et contrôle parlementaire, 1972.
- Braun, Peter: Der Bogen darf nicht überspannt werden. Die Suche nach einer neuen Luftverteidigungskonzeption Ende der fünfziger Jahre und die Beschaffung des Mirage III S, master's thesis, University of Zurich, 2000.
- Braun, Peter: "Die Nuklearbewaffnungsoption der Mirage III S", in: ASMZ, 166/4, 2000, pp. 12–13.