Kiichi Arita

Kiichi Arita
有田 喜一
Arita in 1967
Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency
In office
12 July 1972 – 22 December 1972
Prime MinisterKakuei Tanaka
Preceded byToshio Kimura
Kakuei Tanaka (acting)
Succeeded byZentarō Kosaka
Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency
In office
30 November 1968 – 14 January 1970
Prime MinisterEisaku Satō
Preceded byKaneshichi Masuda
Succeeded byYasuhiro Nakasone
Minister of Education
In office
1 August 1966 – 3 December 1966
Prime MinisterEisaku Satō
Preceded byUmekichi Nakamura
Succeeded byToshihiro Kennoki
Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency
In office
1 August 1966 – 3 December 1966
Prime MinisterEisaku Satō
Preceded byShōkichi Uehara
Succeeded bySusumu Nikaidō
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
In office
15 March 1948 – 15 October 1948
Serving with Shintarō Fukushima
Prime MinisterHitoshi Ashida
Preceded bySueichi Takikawa
Eki Sone
Succeeded byRyōgo Hashimoto
Yūichi Kōri
Member of the House of Representatives
In office
20 November 1960 – 9 December 1976
Preceded byMorio Sasaki
Succeeded byYōichi Tani
ConstituencyHyōgo 5th
In office
23 January 1949 – 25 April 1958
Preceded byTetsuzo Kojima
Succeeded byMorio Sasaki
ConstituencyHyōgo 5th
Personal details
Born(1901-04-30)30 April 1901
Died9 February 1986(1986-02-09) (aged 84)
PartyLiberal Democratic
Other political
affiliations
DP (1947–1950)
NDP (1950–1952)
Kaishintō (1952–1954)
JDP (1954–1955)
Alma materTokyo Imperial University

Kiichi Arita (Japanese: 有田 喜一; 30 April 1901 – 9 February 1986) was a Japanese politician. During his time in politics, he served as Director of the Economic Planning Agency, Director of the Defense Agency, and Minister of Education.

Career

As Chairman of the Research Commission on National Security, Arita participated in the debate over the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The three pillars supporting the treaty were "non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology." Arita and his clique agreed with the first two, but did not like the third. However, Arita was willing to accept the treaty's pillars.[1]

Arita was skeptical of the Chinese nuclear program, perceiving it as a direct "threat" and stating so in 1969. He thus called on Japan to increase its preparedness for a "worst-case scenario". This was before the change in the Defense Agency's perception of China to an indirect threat in early 1970 under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.[2] Arita was also the writer of the first Defense white paper in Japan in 1970 - his original draft argued for increased defense capability if there was ever a "delay" in assistance from the US in case of an invasion, but the final draft saw Arita back down on this, as he called for "autonomous defence capability" only, a controversial move.[3]

Arita was one of the two supporters of Takeo Fukuda who were chosen to have a ministerial position under Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. Fukuda and his supporters were angered by the appointment of Tanaka as the successor of Satō, as Fukuda had previously been one of the top candidates for succeeding him. Upon his calling to the cabinet, then, Arita declined service in his position, citing the lack of representation for Fukuda supporters within the government. However, Tanaka convinced Fukuda to let his two supporters serve in their roles.[4]

References

Citations

  1. ^ Takeda & Kim 2021.
  2. ^ Oren & Brummer 2020, p. 92-3.
  3. ^ Tan 1989, p. 51.
  4. ^ Chapin 1972, p. 170.

Bibliography

  • Chapin, Emerson (1972). "Men and Politics in Post-Sato Japan". Journal of International Affairs. 26 (2): 167–178. JSTOR 24356508. Retrieved 15 June 2021.
  • Oren, Eitan; Brummer, Matthew (Fall 2020). "Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan". Journal of Cold War Studies. 22 (4): 71–112. doi:10.1162/jcws_a_00948. Retrieved 14 May 2021.
  • Takeda, Yu; Kim, Ju Hyung (17 March 2021). "Japan and the Creation of the NPT Regime". Wilson Center. Retrieved 14 May 2021.
  • Tan, Andrew T.H. (1989). "Japan's defence: Development Amidst Constraints". Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 3 (1): 49–69. doi:10.1080/09557578908400024. Retrieved 15 June 2021.