Kazakh–Dzungar Wars

The Kazakh–Dzungar Wars were a series of military conflicts between the Kazakh jüzes (three tribal confederations of the Kazakh Khanate) and the Dzungar Khanate lasting from the 17th to the mid-18th century.

In the 15th century, the Oirats—a Western Mongolian people who had recently established their own state—began expanding into the territory of present-day Kazakhstan. Seeking to control key trade routes and fertile agricultural oases in Jetisu, they launched repeated raids into Central Asia, particularly against the Uzbek Khanate, ruled by Abu'l-Khayr Khan. In 1457, the Oirat forces under Uch-Temur Taishi decisively defeated Abu'l-Khayr Khan's army near the Uzbek capitol of Sighnaq after a prolonged battle. Forced to retreat behind the city walls, Abulkhair concluded a peace agreement with the Oirats, the terms of which, though not explicitly recorded, were reportedly humiliating for the Shaybanids. The Oirats plundered and devastated cities such as Tashkent, Turkistan, and Shakhrukhia before their withdrawal. Following the defeat, Abulkhair temporarily abandoned Turkistan and returned to the steppes of Desht-i-Kipchak, later reappearing in the Syr Darya region in 1460.^[1][2][3][4]

During this period of political instability, two Chinggisid sultans—Janibek Khan and Kerei Khan—disillusioned with Abulkhair's rule, led their followers eastward to Semirechye, settling in Moghulistan. There, they founded the Kazakh Khanate in 1465. Their followers, who broke away from the Uzbek Khanate, were initially referred to as "Uzbek Cossacks" (from the Turkic qazaq, meaning "free"),^[5] later simply known as Kazakhs (qazaqtar). In the mid-15th century, the first clashes occurred between the Oirats and Kazakhs led by Tevekkul.^[6] The Oirats and Kazakhs fought with a Kazakh loss, failing to subjugate the Oirats.^[7] Over time, Kazakh nomadic camps of the Middle and Little juzes were routed. In pursuit, Oirat troops crossed the Ishim, Irghiz, and Emba rivers and, skirting the Aral Sea from the north, ravaged the areas around the cities of Urgench and Khiva.^[7]

According to the historical chronicle Badai al-Waqai (Persian: بدايع‌الوقايع, lit. 'Amazing Events'), written by the late-medieval Tajik historian Wasifi during the reign of Tayir Khan in the early 16th century, a fortress named Jatan (or Jashan—its exact location remains unverified by modern scholarship) was constructed to defend against Oirat incursions.

The internal fragmentation of the Kazakh Khanate in the late 16th and early 17th centuries weakened its position and contributed to the rise of a new regional power—the Dzungar Khanate, established in the early 17th century. The first phase of clashes between the Kazakhs and the Dzungars began in 1635, shortly after the formation of the Dzungar state.

In 1635, Erdeni Batur, the ruler of the Dzungar Khanate, saw an opportunity with the Kazakhs were politically divided, and he decided to launch a major punitive campaign on 1640. Their target was the Middle Jüz of the Kazakhs. Jangir Khan, the leader of the Middle Jüz, managed to gather only 600 loyal warriors to face this overwhelming invasion force.

From there, Jangir Khan, participated in a major battle against the Dzungarian troops in 1635 at the Battle of Urmity.^[8] Which was one of the first major recorded clashes between Jangir Khan and the Dzungars. Historical accounts suggest it was a significant defeat for the Kazakhs. Jangir Khan was reportedly captured during the battle. His captivity lasted for a period (some sources suggest several years) before he managed to escape or was released, an experience that would have given him direct insight into Dzungar military tactics and politics.^[9]

Later from 1640, Dzungar launched another campaign against the Kazakhs by Erdeni batur himself taking two lands of the Altai Kyrgyz and 40 thousand Tokmaks. Afterwards he continued ravaging several of the towns situated between Turkestan and Tashkent, killing many and taking large numbers of prisoners. The total number of the dead and captured was estimated at 30,000.^[10] Then in 1643, the Battle of Orbulaq took place in the gorge of the Orbulaq River, led by Jangir Khan with the support of 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers,^[11] aided by the Emir of Samarkand Jalantos Bahadur, who was from the Kazakh clan of Tortkara, successfully defeated Dzungars (2,000-15,000) using Volleys of musket fire cut down the advancing Dzungars, while archers and warriors with melee weapons repelled any who managed to get close. The terrain and fortifications allowed the Kazakhs to inflict massive casualties while minimizing their own losses.^[12]

Later, Erdeni batur continued his campaigns in 1646, counterattacking Jangir's liberation forces and capturing Sairam and Turkistan; forcing subjugation to the Kazakhs.^[13] Later Jangir asked Bukharan assistance once more with Abd al-'Azīz arrived in the area with an army, They repelled the Dzungar army, leaving Erdeni disappointed by Abd al-'Azīz's claims.^[14] Erdeni sent a Khoshut, named Galdamba (also called Galdam) at the age of 17,^[15] he battled Jangir khan and effectively killed him in battle of Turkistan, and in from towards that he campaigned around the Alatau region,^[15] whilst also battling an Uzbek relief force in favor of the Kazakhs by Governor of Bukhara -- Abushuker noyan at Chu river and fought to the Talas river, where he killed him in battle and defeated his force of 38,000 men.^[16]

After a period of relative stability following the invasions by Erdeni, the Dzungar Khanate was consolidated and massively strengthened under Galdan Boshoght (r. 1678-1697). Galdan was an ambitious ruler who had received military training and political backing from the Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy, even holding the title of Boshoghtu Khan (Khan by Divine Grace).^[17] He unified the Oirat tribes and sought to expand his empire westward, directly confronting the Kazakh Khanate.^[18]

After Tauke Khan came to power, the Kazakh Khanate began to actively strengthen itself, which caused concern for the Dzungar Khan Galdan. In response, Galdan attempted to weaken the influence of the Kazakhs and encourage them to adopt Lamaism. To this end, he sent envoys to the Kazakh rulers with an offer to unite and recognize Lamaism, but the Kazakhs refused. This led to conflict between the two sides, as the Kazakhs did not want to renounce their traditional beliefs. During this conflict, Galdan's troops captured a number of cities that had previously recognized Tauq's authority, including Sairam, Menkent, Kharasman, and others. The only exceptions were the cities of Turkestan and Tashkent. Turkestan remained under Tauke's control, while Tashkent voluntarily recognized Galdan's authority. The Dzungars also captured one of Tauke's sons, whom they took to Lhasa, confirming Galdan's serious intentions to impose Lamaism on the Kazakhs.^[19]

In 1681, the invasion by Galdan Boshugtu Khan started with Galdan's forces of about 25,000 to 50,000 men sweeping through the Tengeri ranges, which were strategic strongholds for the Kazakhs. This move secured his southern flank and soon invaded the territories of Semirechye and South Kazakhstan; the Kazakh ruler Tauke Khan was defeated on the Ili River valley, at Orqaq.^[20] And he also took Tauke's grandson, Abdulmambet as a prisoner of war.^[21]

From 1683, the Dzungars seized Sayram, Tashkent, Shymkent, and Taraz. The success was so profound that contemporary sources describe it as one of the darkest periods for the Kazakhs. The Dzungar occupation was reportedly brutal, leading to widespread loss of life, enslavement, and the destruction of livelihoods. After his victories, Galdan did not directly administer these cities in the modern sense. Instead, he established Dzungar hegemony, forcing the Kazakh Khanate into a state of vassalage.^[22] After that Galdan subjugated the Black Khirgizs and ravaged the Fergana Valley. From 1685 Galdan's forces aggressively pushed the Kazakhs. While his general Rabtan took Taraz, and his main force forced the Kazakhs to migrate westwards.^[23] Later in 1686 He successfully took Andijan^[24] and in the following year or 1687, He attempted to siege Turkistan but abandoned it after a war broke out between the Dzungar Khanate and the Khalkhas against the Khalkha Prince, Chakhundorji

With this, the Kazakhs, particularly the Senior and Middle Jüzes, were forced to pay an annual tribute to the Dzungar Khanate. This often took the form of goods, livestock, and even human hostages to ensure compliance and The Kazakh Khanate remained politically fractured. While Tauke Khan is remembered as a last great unifier, his authority was severely weakened after the defeats.^[25]

The campaigns led by the Dzungar troops in 1710–1719 caused a dispute and destabilization between the Kazakh clans, as each year the fear of a Dzungar invasion grew. Moreover, militarily the Dzungar Khanate represented a serious threat for the Russia, with the Failure or Buzholz's expedition and even more so for the Kazakhs with the Previous war. Compared to some Asians who were used to traditional warfare, the Dzungars led by Tsewang Rabtan, who had a large army, for the first time began using firearms and artillery at the end of the 17th century, as they bought them from Russian gunsmiths and cast them off with a help of Johan Gustaf Renat, a former Swedish soldier who was held as a captive after being kidnapped by Dzungars during an expedition in Siberia. While the Kazakhs were armed with bows, sabers, and spears, these were largely inferior to the Dzungar weaponry, with only few Kazakh warriors being equipped with rifles.^[26]

The invasion by Dzungars crippled the strength of the Kazakhs. Using their military superiority, the Dzungar troops temporarily seized part of Zhetysu, and the advancing forces also reached the Sarysu River in Central Kazakhstan. This sparked an alarm among the Kazakhs, and encouraged famous elders, biys, people's batyrs, and the most far-sighted Chingizids, to make efforts to unite the military and civilian potential of the three Juzes. The first Kurultai was held in the summer of 1710 in the Karakum district. The Kurultai set up a general Kazakh militia that was led by Bogenbai, who was seen as a prominent figure by others.^[27]

Bogenbai developed a plan to repel the enemy. Subsequently, the Kazakhs dealt a series of heavy blows to the Dzungars.^[28] Thanks to the unity achieved and coordinated military actions, the Kazakh militias were able to win several victories over the Dzungars in 1711–1712.

In 1716, Tsewang Rabtan sent part of his troops to Kazakhstan. During this offensive, fierce battles began between the Dzungars and Kazakh militias, where the Kazakhs suffered heavy human and material losses. ^[29]

A Kazakh militia in the spring of 1717 at the district of the River Ayaguz led by Kaip and Abulkhair Khan were defeated in the Battle of Ayagoz, where 30,000 Kazakhs were attacked by a small Dzungar border detachment numbering only 1,000 men, who tore down trees in the gorge and sat in an improvised trench for three days supporting each other while delaying the Kazakh army. On the last day, the Dzungar force of 1,500 people defeated the Kazakhs, who, despite overwhelming superiority in numbers and in firearms, could not withstand the Dzungar's brutal penetrating strike that involved a mounted horse attack and subsequent hand-to-hand combat which caused them to retreat.^[30][31][32] Then they attacked the Kazakhs at Yuruktau and won, wounding Abulkhair khan in the process.^[33]

Later the death of Khan Tauke in 1718 shattered the nascent Kazakh unity. The Jüzes fell into a dispute over succession, and the centralized command structure collapsed.^[34] Seizing the opportunity presented by Kazakh disunity after Tauke's death, Tsewang Rabtan launched a new, massive invasion meeting the now-divided Kazakh forces. Unlike the united army envisioned at the Karakum Council, the Kazakh forces were likely disjointed, with different Jüzes and sultans acting with limited coordination. They gathered at Jana-Korgan for a desperate defense. The most devastating defeat occurred for the Kazakhs at their position at the Jana-Korgan Disaster the Kazakhs suffered a catastrophic defeat, The Dzungars also defeated the Kazakh troops on the banks of the Arys,^[35] Bugen, and Chayan rivers and devastated the entire South.^[36]

The death of Khan Tauke in 1718 left the Kazakhs without a recognized leader and plunged them into internecine strife. For the next several years, the Kazakh hordes were preoccupied with their internal rivalries, while the Dzungar ruler Tsewang Rabtan carefully prepared his forces for a decisive strike. The Kazakhs, divided and unaware of the gathering storm, were utterly unprepared for what was to come. The foreign policy situation for the Kazakh Khan at the end of the 17th and early 18th century was difficult. From the west, the Volga Kalmyks and the Yaik Cossacks constantly raided the Kazakhs, with the Siberian Cossacks and Bashkirs from the north, Bukhara and the Khiva people from the south, but the main military threat came from the east, the side of the Dzungar Khanate, whose frequent military incursions into the Kazakh lands in the early 1720s was an on alarming scale. A fearsome power in the east of the Dzungar Khanate, the Qing dynasty, waited for a favorable opportunity to eliminate the Dzungars.^[37] Although a new Dzungar–Qing war began in 1717 and lasted until 1720, Tsewang Rabtan continued military operations against the Kazakhs.^[38]

The Dzungars had an advantage over the Kazakhs in terms of military potential, primarily in terms of weaponry and military organization. This circumstance was explained by the geographical and natural location of the Dzungar Khanate. A more limited territory compared to the Kazakh Khanate and a high density of human resources contributed to the cohesion and unity of the Oirats. In addition, the Dzungar Khanate was capable of producing its own weapons and military equipment and had a strict military-administrative system that allowed it to create and maintain its military viability.^[39]

In February–March 1723, Dzungar commanders suddenly attacked the Kazakh nomadic camps of the Senior and Middle Jüzes, concentrating their main forces along a wide front from the upper reaches of the Irtysh river to the Chu and Talas rivers. The attack occurred during a difficult season for the Kazakhs the time of livestock lambing and the transition to spring pastures. The uluses were in their wintering areas and scattered, and therefore were unable to organize resistance. The Kazakhs of the Senior and part of the Middle Jüz crossed the Syr Darya river above the mouth of the Chirchik and retreated toward Samarkand and Bukhara. The Junior Jüz crossed the Syr Darya in its middle reaches and fled to Khiva, as well as north and northwest toward the borders of the Russian Empire — to the territories of the Yaik Cossacks, Bashkirs, and Kalmyks. The politically fragmented Kazakhs were caught completely unprepared. Their resistance collapsed. The Dzungar army swept across the steppe, capturing and sacking the Southern Kazakhstan and Jetisu, defeating the Kazakh militia which lost the city of Tashkent and Sairam. The new Uzbek territories now included Khujand, Samarkand, and Andijan which were reliant on Dzungar protection. Furthermore, they captured the Fergana Valley as well.^[40] a detachment of Oirats attacked deep into territory previously controlled by the Kazakhs, including the cities of Turkistan.^[41]

In mid-July 1723, Ayuka sent his envoy Kuzytush to Abulkhair Khan to negotiate peace. On the Temir River, the Kalmyk delegation encountered a 15,000-strong Kazakh army led by Abulkhair himself. However, the Kazakh khan declared:

"He is going to wage war against the Kalmyks and the Russians, and forty thousand hordes will be with him."

After this, three Kalmyk envoys were executed, and the remaining seven were taken prisoner. Abulkhair then continued his advance toward the Trans-Volga steppes, seeking to drive the Kalmyks and Russians from both banks of the Yaik River and to expand the Kazakh nomadic territories to the northwest. The rapid advance of the Kazakh army forced the Kalmyk taishis Dorzhi Nazarov, Khoshot-Dondok, and Lekbey to hastily retreat from the left bank of the Yaik to Krasny Yar.

On August 5, Yaik colonel Zakharov reported to the Astrakhan administration that a 5,000-strong detachment of Kazakhs and Karakalpaks had crossed the Yaik and moved westward, intending to attack Russian settlements, as well as Kalmyk and Cheremis (Mari) encampments. Following this, Ayuka Khan requested military assistance from Astrakhan governor A.P. Volynsky, who ordered an artillery unit and six squadrons of Russian soldiers to be sent to aid the Kalmyks.^[42]

By late August, however, Abulkhair's forces defeated the uluses of Taisha Lekbey, numbering about 2,000 families. As a result of the fighting, the Kazakhs captured a large number of prisoners and livestock, which were sold to Dorzhi Nazarov, after which the Kazakhs continued their advance deep into Kalmyk territory.^[43] In the autumn, the Kazakhs captured 5,000 Kalmyk kibitkas in the uluses of Ayuka and Lubzhi.^[44]

Alarmed by the Kazakh attacks on the Kalmyk Khanate, the Russian imperial government in December 1723 sent a decree to Ayuka demanding assistance in repelling the Kazakh–Karakalpak offensive:

"The Kirghiz-Kaisaks (Kazakhs; Russians used to call Kazakhs as kirghiz, kirghiz-kaisaks) and the Karakalpaks, having gathered in forty thousand men, are marching against our imperial cities and your uluses, our subject, for the purpose of ravaging towns and villages… You, our subject, must hinder them, so that they may not reach the destruction of our cities and districts.^[45][46]"

Following this, the combined forces of Ayuka and Dosang managed to halt the further advance of Abulkhair's detachments, although hostilities did not cease entirely.

In early 1724, major fighting along the Kazakh–Kalmyk border subsided, except for a Karakalpak raid on Kalmyk encampments near the Guryev town in January.^[47] In the spring of the same year, Abulkhair resumed his offensive.

In early March, a Kazakh–Karakalpak force numbering 13,000 men invaded the Left bank of the Volga and, 60 km from Saratov, attacked the uluses of Dorzhi Nazarov. 50 Kalmyks were taken prisoner, and 8,500 head of livestock were driven off. In nearby Kalmyk encampments, 400 people and 13,600 head of livestock were captured. On March 20, 1724, Astrakhan official S. P. Shakhmatov reported clashes on the meadow side of the Volga and a battle near the Elton area, where the Kalmyks lost 60 killed and 60 captured, while the Kazakhs suffered 55 killed and captured.

In April, the Karakalpaks again attacked Kalmyk encampments near Guryev, breaking into the Kalmyk camp but being repelled by Russian artillery.

Seeking to keep the left bank of the Volga under Kalmyk control, Dorzhi Nazarov decided to give the Kazakhs a pitched battle. By August, he had gathered an 18,000-strong army, while evacuating the peaceful Kalmyk population toward the Volga under the protection of guard detachments and Russian troops.

In early August, Kalmyk scouts crossed the Yaik and attacked a Karakalpak reconnaissance party, then retreated. Soon after, the Oirats were overtaken by the Karakalpaks and engaged in battle, though most of the Kalmyk detachment managed to escape. The reconnaissance estimated the Kazakh army's strength at 10,000 men, and Nazarov's assembled force was sufficient to repel a Kazakh attack. The Kazakh commanders, in turn, postponed a large-scale offensive against the Volga Kalmyk encampments, relying on the element of surprise.

On August 21, a small detachment of the Kazakh batyr Eset attacked and defeated the ulus of Lubzhi, then retreated. However, the Kalmyk ruler managed to assemble an army and caught up with the Kazakhs in the Uzeni area. In the ensuing battle, the Kazakh detachment was destroyed, and only eight men survived, including Eset himself.

According to the Russian historian L. A. Bobrov, the Battle of Uzeni reduced the military potential of the Kazakh army and clearly demonstrated that the conquest of Kalmyk lands was a rather difficult task. However, according to the Kazakh historian R.Zh. Temirgaliev, the victory had mainly a propagandistic effect, since the main successes still remained with the Kazakh side.

Despite the defeat in August, Abulkhair Khan managed to significantly weaken the military potential of the Kalmyk Khanate and eliminate the threat of a Kalmyk attack on the Junior Jüz. After that, the Kazakh khan shifted military operations to the Southeastern Front.^[48]

The following year, 1724, also in late winter, the Dzungars launched a second attack along the Chu River, striking the wintering quarters of the Senior jüz. The Argyns and Jalairs were driven out of the Chu Valley. The Dzungars captured, plundered, and destroyed the trading centers of northern Karatau, including the city of Suzak. Some Kazakhs from the Chu River may have fled north to Betpak-Dala and Balkhash, while others may have retreated to the Karatau Mountains, using the mountain gorges as fortresses. The first two attacks did not affect the junior jüz.^[49]

Later on 1725, the Kazakhs, led by Abulkhair Khan, liberated Turkistan with five thousand troops, but in the spring of 1725, the Dzungars captured the city again.^[50] During the darkest days, large-scale battles were impossible. The Kazakh resistance took the form of Guerrilla Tactics with Small, mobile detachments of Kazakh batyrs harrying Dzungar supply lines, attacked scouting parties, and conducted raids. This constant pressure wore down the occupiers. Later on Bauzda, with Batyr Totai from the Akkozha sub-clan. But However they were defeated and later massacred by the Dzungars^[51]

After Abulkhair's defeat in the struggle for the Syrdarya region in 1725, about 10,000 Kazakh kibitkas once again moved northwest toward the Kalmyk pastures, assuming that the Kalmyks had retreated to the right bank of the Volga. However, upon learning that the Kalmyks had remained in place, they turned back and stopped along the Emba River. In early August 1725, a 20,000-strong Kalmyk army under the command of Galdan-Dandjin advanced eastward, covering the distance between the Yaik and the Emba in 9 days. Upon reaching the first Kazakh encampments, the Kalmyks destroyed a thousand yurts and, from another Kazakh ulus of 10,000 yurts, drove off livestock and horse herds becoming the "Ulus devastation".^[52] While returning to the Yaik, Dorzhi Nazarov learned that his army was being pursued by several thousand Kazakhs and Karakalpaks. Remaining near the Yaik, Nazarov dispatched a reconnaissance detachment "in the Kazakh direction. The August campaign of Galdan-Dandjin, according to the admissions of the Kalmyk rulers themselves, did not yield significant results. From the Karakalpaks and the Kazakhs we were in great fear, and from our campaign achieved little, except that we further provoked and angered them.^[53]

In September 1725, the Kazakhs launched a new offensive. According to a Kalmyk who escaped from captivity, 17,000 Kazakhs were moving toward the Kalmyks, ostensibly to conclude a peace agreement and then to destroy the Yaik town, intending to settle their uluses along the Yaik River.^[54]

On October 6, Saratov authorities reported that 400 Karakalpaks had attacked Kalmyk uluses near the Ryn Sands, capturing prisoners and livestock.^[55] Later on October 30, a 17,000-strong Kazakh–Karakalpak army appeared in the Karakum region. According to the Samara commandant Kushnikov, they intended to seize the Cossack town and devastate the Kalmyk uluses, then cross the Volga and flee to the Kuban.^[56]

In a conversation between the Kalmyk high priest Shakur-Lama and V. P. Beklemishev in February 1726, it was reported that in the autumn of 1725, 10,000 Kazakhs under the leadership of Khans Abulkhair and Sameke attacked the ulus of Lekbey and defeated it. ^[57]However, the Kalmyk nobles managed to mobilize a 20,000-strong army and defeated the Kazakh detachment. Several smaller Kazakh groups were driven to the Caspian Sea and annihilated, while the main force was surrounded near the Yaik.

Thanks to Russian artillery delivered to the Kalmyks in time, they managed to inflict a defeat on the Kazakh detachment, which lost from 1,000 to 2,000 men killed in battle, and to conclude a truce with the Kazakh leaders.^[58] The Kalmyks succeeded in reclaiming all captured property and took 13 (or, according to other accounts, 60) amanats with their attendants.

In 1726, a meeting of representatives from the Kazakh juzes took place in Ordabasy near Turkestan, which decided to organize another militia. The committee chose Abilhair Khan who was the leader of the Younger juz to be a commander of an army.^[59] After the meeting, the militia of the three Juzes united and were headed by Abulhair and Bogenbai Batyr who in the Battle of Bulanty, defeated the Dzungar troops, which occurred in the foothills of Ulytau, in the Karasyir area. This was the first, over many years, a major victory for Kazakhs over the Dzungars that gained a moral and strategic recognition. The terrain where this battle took place was called "Kalma қırılғan" – "a place where the Kalmaks were exterminated".^[60]

In 1727, Tsewang Rabtan died which caused a rivalry between the contenders and heirs to the throne with most of the competition revolving around the sons of Tsewang Rabtan who were Lausan Shono and Galdan Tseren. Galdan Tseren, after defeating his brother Lausan Shono for the power, had to deal with a two-front war conflict. This internal Dzungar weakness provided the Kazakhs with a critical window of opportunity to consolidate their forces and prepare for a final, decisive confrontation.

In November 1728, Sameke Khan sent a special embassy to the Volga Kalmyks for peace negotiations. The talks led to mutual reconciliation, allovwing the Kazakh khans to shift their main military efforts to the Southeastern Front.

Although the Kazakhs won their first major victory over the troops of the Dzungar Khanate, the task of liberating the Kazakh lands in the south and east of the country remained on the agenda. On November 6, 1728, the khan of the Middle Zhuz, Semeke, sent an embassy to the Volga Kalmyks for peace talks in order to secure his western rear and enable the Kazakhs to concentrate all their forces against the troops of the Dzungar Khanate .^[61]

At the kurultai, which, according to Alexander Shaidatovich, took place after 1728, Khan Abulhair of the Junior Juz was elected commander-in-chief of the united Kazakh militia.^[62] The last major battle between the Kazakh militia and the troops of the Dzungar Khanate took place 120 kilometers from Lake Balkhash in the Angraka area.^{[b][63][62][64]} According to estimates by Moiseev, the Battle of Anrakai took place in 1729,^[63] Kadybaev estimates 1729 or spring 1730.^[62]

According to Tynyshpaev, during this offensive, Kazakh horsemen repeatedly struck enemy forces. Large combat units were commanded by sultans Abilmambet, Barak, Abylai, Bulkhaiir, and other Chingizids. Along with them, representatives of the "Kara Suyek" such as the batyrs Bogenbay and Eset from the generation of Zhetiru of the Younger Zhuz, Bogenbay from the Kanzhigaly clan and his namesake from the Shakshak clan of the Argyn tribe of the Middle Zhuz, as well as the batyrs Kabanbay, Zhanibek, Otegen, Tailak, Sauryk, Malaysary, and many others.^[65]

In 1729, the Dzungar leader Galdan Tseren, seeking to regain the initiative, probed the possibility of a joint military campaign with the Russian Empire against the Kazakhs. He asked the Russian envoy M. Etigerov, "Are they not attacking the Cossacks [Kazakhs] on your side?" However, the Siberian administration categorically rejected this proposed alliance.^[66]

The conflict continued through raids and counter-raids. In the winter of 1731, Kazakh troops attacked a Dzungar trade caravan, capturing a Russian convoy in the process. The Kazakh batyrs subsequently released the Russians but took the Uyghur merchants prisoner, demonstrating the complex interplay of relations in the region.^[67]

The Kazakhs dealt significant blows to the Dzungars throughout this period. In the summer of 1730, they captured about a thousand Derbet yurts with their livestock. In the fall of 1731, a deep Kazakh raid into Dzungaria resulted in the capture of "many people, women and children, yurts with a thousand or more head of cattle and belongings." At the same time, 10,000 troops were sent to guard the nearest border areas with Kazakhstan against attacks from the Kazakh state. The Oirat armies constantly maintained strong guard forces, detachments, and sentries, fearing attacks from the Kazakhs.^[67][68]

In response to planned Kazakh offensives, a 7,000-strong Dzungar army attacked the Kazakh uluses of the Middle Jüz in the summer of 1732 but was successfully repelled.^[69] In the same year, 700 Dzungar families were captured.^[68]

The Russian presence became an increasingly important factor in the post-war politics. When the Russian ambassador A. I. Tevkelev arrived in the Kazakh steppe in 1732, tensions among Kazakh feudal lords over the issue of allegiance to Russia provided Galdan Tseren with another opportunity to propose a military alliance to the Russians against the Kazakhs.^[70]

In May 1733, the Oirat prince Tsagan arrived in Semipalatinsk with a formal request for Russian troops to jointly "destroy the Cossack horde." The Russian commanders refused, stating they could not provide military assistance without higher orders, especially in the absence of open conflict with the Kazakhs.^[70]

The Dzungar campaign against the Middle Jüz in 1732 ended in failure, with the Dzungar troops returning "with great losses, so that almost all of them remained there." The invasion was significant enough to prevent the traditional meeting of the Middle Jüz nobility from taking place that year.^[71]

At that time, the Kazakhs of the Junior Horde only occasionally participated in raids on Dzungaria, usually attacking the Volga Kalmyks or Bashkirs.^[70]

In the Senior Zhuz, the situation was quite different. Soviet and pre-revolutionary historical literature hardly ever raised the question of the time and circumstances under which the feudal lords of the Senior Zhuz were forced to acknowledge their dependence on Dzungar Khanate. Appolova and a number of other Soviet historians believe that the Senior Zhuz recognized its dependence on Dzungar Khanate after the Oirat invasion in 1723–1725.^[70]

Around 1735, the Dzungars invaded the territory of the Senior Zhuz. Kazakh feudal lords were forced to recognize Dzungar rule. Galdan Tseren's motives for capturing the Senior Zhuz and the cities of Prisyrind were to control trade routes, “secure his borders from incursions by Kazakh militias, and obtain a new source of income.”^[68]

During the reign of Tsewang Rabtan in Dzungaria in 1710-1719, and 1723–1732, several major invasions were launched into Central Asia and modern-day Kazakhstan. Despite initial successes, Tsewang Rabtan was unable to subjugate any of the Kazakh tribes. In 1727–1730, the Kazakhs defeated the Oirat armies of Galdan Tseren. However, internal political strife prevented the Kazakhs from using these victories to regain their lost nomadic lands in Semirechye and modern-day Eastern Kazakhstan.^[72]

Under pressure from continuing Dzungar raids, Khan Semeke of the Middle Jüz also accepted Russian citizenship in 1732. However, Kazakh khans like Ablai of the Middle Jüz would famously pursue a "double oath" policy, swearing allegiance to both Russia and Qing China to maintain maximum autonomy.^[73]

After concluding peace with the Qing Empire, Galdan Tseren established his rule over the Senior Horde in 1735. The feudal lords of the Senior Zhuz were forced to send hostages to Urga every year, and the population had to pay a tax of one steppe fox skin per family per year. Simultaneously with the invasion of the territory of the Senior Zhuz and Central Asia, the Oirat feudal lords invaded the border nomadic lands of the Middle Zhuz. This is evidenced, in particular, by the testimony of soldier Ivan Khoroshkov. The Oirats told him that they had gone on a campaign against the Middle Zhuz, "and defeated several Cossack uluses and took a hundred men captive from the Cossack horde, and drove away ten thousand horses and a hundred camels... There were no Cossack Hordes fortresses near the Irtysh, and those that were there were all destroyed, while the rest scattered."^[74]

Some of the rulers of the Junior and Middle Zhuz during the struggle with the Dzungar Khanate accepted Russian protectorate. According to historian Moiseev, this was done in order to secure their possessions from Russia. The Russian government, in turn, sought to use the Kazakhs to protect Siberia from possible invasions by the Oirats and to gain an ally in the Kazakh militias.^[72]

At the end of the 1730s, after concluding a truce with the Qing Dynasty, the ruling class of the Dzungar Khanate began active military-political preparations for another invasion of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. In the spring of 1735, Bogenbay Batyr informed the tsarist authorities that the Kazakhs who had escaped from Dzungar captivity warned that Galdan Tseren was planning to send an army to attack the Kaisaks of the Middle Juz.

In 1739, The invasion of Kazakhstan began in the autumn of 1739 with the total strength of around 30,000 troops^[75]. However, the khans and sultans of the Middle Juz only started to gather troops and prepare to repel the enemy at the very last moment, when the invasion of the Dzungars had already begun. The political situation of the Middle Juz and the rest of Kazakh Khanate remained difficult.^[76] Local conflicts still occurred in the Younger jüz where some of the feudal lords, who were led by Sultan Batyr, clashed with Khan Abulkhair. In 1737, after Sameke Khan of the Middle jüz died, he was replaced by Abilmambet. Despite him being elected to be a khan, Abilmambet was hesitant and did not enforce strong authority in the Kazakh steppe.^[77]

Thus, the Kazakh feudal lords still engaged in internal disputes and did not take any precautions to organize proper defenses on their borders. In the winter of 1739–1740. The Dzungar army struck in all directions, in the North, they attacked from the Irtysh River, causing a considerable damage to the nomads of the Middle Juz. The Dzungar army also advanced rapidly from the east, bypassing Russian forts and pushing deep into the territories of the Great Jüz (Uly Jüz) in Semirechye and southern Kazakhstan. The forces of the Great Jüz, isolated and unable to unite effectively with the other Jüzes in time, were overwhelmed. The Dzungars inflicted a severe defeat, capturing vast herds and taking many prisoners. Having crippled the Great Jüz, Galdan Tseren's forces turned their attention northward, threatening the heartlands of the Middle Jüz (Orta Jüz).^[78]

At the end of February 1741, the 30,000 strong Dzungar army, under the command of Septen and his elder son, Galdan Tsereng Lama-Dorji, again invaded Kazakhstan and reached Tobol and the Ishim river with skirmishes. The campaign lasted until the summer of 1741.^[79] During these battles against Dzungars, Abylai Khan, one of the prominent batyrs, was captured along with his companions. Commanding a small scout detachment of only 200 soldiers, Abylai burst directly into the location of the enemy's main forces. Surrounded on all sides by an army of thousands, the Kazakhs were captured. His capture was a significant blow to Kazakh morale and military leadership.^[80] He was held prisoner for several years before a ransom was negotiated.^[81] Shortly after not long fights, a small force of Sultan Barak was defeated as well. Sultan Durgun, Akymshyn batyr, Koptugan were captured and taken to Dzungaria.^[82][83][84]

Despite these successes, the Dzungars failed to achieve their main goal—to defeat the main forces of the Middle Zhuz and destroy its population. The bulk of the Kazakh uluses migrated beyond the Tobol River, after which their enemies sent a guide from among the prisoners to follow them. He deliberately led them through frost and snow, causing many to freeze to death. The enraged Dzungars burned him and, abandoning their further advance, returned. And to indicate the other such Cossack hordes, the captive comrade led them, the Kalmyks of the Cossack horde, and he deliberately led them astray and caused great snow and frost, because he was a heretic, and because of that, the Kalmyks barely escaped, and several died from the cold, and so they, the Kalmyks burned that heretic thief and went back to attack the Cossack dwellings, which were apparently very crowded, but because of the above-mentioned loss of their people from the frost, they did not dare to attack them and so they returned.".^[85] About 15,000 soldiers returned with Septem, while the other detachments continued to operate separately, “behind rocks and close to Kirghiz (Kazakh) dwellings.”.^[86]

Attempts by the Dzungar command to strike from the south also ended in failure. According to a Yenisei Kyrgyz who escaped from captivity, “the Cossack horde fought against the Kalmyk forces last winter... and the Cossack horde defeated the Kalmyk forces and killed many of them on the right wing.” The batyr Olzhabay distinguished himself in these battles, and folk legends and songs refer to him as the victor over Galdan Tseren.^[87][88] Kazakh troops also made several incursions into the territory of the Dzungar Khanate, defeating the right wing of the Dzungar army and crushing the ulus of Septenya.^[85]

In the summer of 1741, a council took place at the headquarters of the Middle Juz Khan, discussing either to continue the war or to start peace negotiations with the Dzungars. The majority spoke for peace, so a Kazakh ambassador was sent to Dzungaria which negotiated terms of an armistice and the release of prisoners, including Abylai Khan. The negotiations ended successfully and Abylai was released. Ablai's release was not an act of Dzungar benevolence. It was the result of a negotiated ransom. Historical accounts and oral traditions suggest the ransom was substantial, further draining the resources of the Middle Jüz. His release was prioritized because of his recognized status as an indispensable leader.^[89][90] This event contributed the start of feudal conflicts in the Dzungar Khanate where clashes took place for the throne of the Dzungarian Khong Tayiji.^[91]

In the summer of 1741, councils of nobles were held in the Middle jüz to discuss the further course of action: whether to continue the war with the Dzungars or to begin peace negotiations. Most of the influential lords were in favor of making peace. On November 11 of that year, Oirat merchants traveling to Russia brought a Kazakh named Urazai, whom they had captured on the way, to the Yamyshevskaya Fortress. In the Chancellery, he stated that “the ambassadors of the Cossack Horde went to Galdan Tseren three months ago to ask him to make peace with the Cossacks”.^[85][92]

In response to the proposal for a truce, Galdan Tseren presented the rulers of the Middle jüz with a number of conditions. He demanded that they send ten noblemen as hostages, “with their houses and livestock,” among whom were to be Sultan Barak, the Zhanibek batyr, and the rebel Karasakal. At the same time, he threatened that in case of refusal, “they would ask for an urgent date and place for battle.” During the negotiations, Galdan Tseren sought to achieve recognition of his sovereignty over the Middle jüz and even the Junior jüz, and used various means to exert pressure, including the issue of prisoner exchange, especially the issue of Abylai Khan. For example, when the Kazakh embassy arrived, the Dzungar khong taishi ordered Abylai's hands and feet to be shackled “and he was kept in chains throughout his stay in Akchura” in order to encourage the Kazakh rulers to be conciliatory and rescue Abylai. After the departure of the Kazakh ambassadors, Abylai was again given a separate yurt, and his freedom of movement was limited only by the guards. The Kazakhs and Dzungars had a long-standing tradition of exchanging prisoners after military clashes.^[92][93]

Although the Junior Horde was practically unaffected by that war, its situation was difficult. This was due to the invasion of Bukhara and then Khiva by the Persian Shah Nadir, who also planned to strike the Kazakh khanates (zhuzes)^[94].

In the fall of 1741, a number of influential feudal lords of the Middle Zhuz, seeking to gain political and material benefits for themselves, in particular to return the areas of southern Kazakhstan captured by the Dzungars, agreed to fulfill some of Galdan Tseren's demands. The khan of the Middle Zhuz, Abilmambet Khan, sent his son as a hostage. His example was followed by some sultans and elders: Abulfayz Khan, Niyaz-batyr, Devletbay, and others^[95]. In March 1743, after the arrival of hostages from Abilmambet, Barak and other Kazakh sultans, Abylai with his son and a number of other noble prisoners were released^[96]. Soon after, Khan Abulkhair of the Junior Zhuz sent his son to Dzungaria. This information was confirmed by Russian ambassador K. Miller^[97].

In an attempt to win over the Kazakh nobility, Dzungarian diplomats constantly emphasized in negotiations that the Kazakhs and Western Mongols were nomadic peoples who had much in common in terms of economy and culture, unlike Russia. In one of his messages, Galdan Tseren openly wrote to Abulkhair that when he sought closeness with Russia, he became an “enemy” to him. He also stated:

"We, the Kalmyks (Dzungars) and Kaisaks (Kazakhs), are both hawks, and we will not kneel before that crow (the Russian empress), for they are carters, and we are Uzbeks (nomads)"

This message contained a hint at a shared historical past, the nomads' contempt for agricultural peoples, and an open call for unity against Russia.^[98]

Meanwhile, the economic and political ties between the Kazakh tribes and Russia continued to strengthen, and among various segments of the population, awareness of the need for unity to resist the Dzungar Khanate grew stronger with each passing year.^[99]

Nevertheless, the inability of the tsarist authorities to protect the Kazakhs, as well as the powerful diplomatic pressure exerted by Galdan Tseren, bore certain fruit. In the early 1740s, pro-Oirat sentiments grew stronger in all Kazakh tribes.^[99]

In the early 1740s, two parties emerged: the Russian Party and the Patriotic Party. Influenced by personal reasons and having secured the support of Galdan Tseren to further their personal interests, sultans and batyrs such as Barak, Abylai Khan, and even Khan Abulmambet began to stand out. On the hostile side, they began to actively engage in trade and expand their connections. However, this did not mean recognition of the Dzungar authority of the khan^[99].

On the other hand, the Russian Party stood out. Although it was small in number, according to Chokan Valikhanov, it was far from insignificant and weak. Its members included Abulkhair Khan (Kazakh Khanate), Janibek, Kulsara, Tlekule's son-in-law Tole-bi, and Kuleke-batyr. Their firm stance against the Huntaiji's advances had a noticeable influence on many wavering and unstable feudal lords.^[99]

Among the influential Kazakh feudal lords in the 1740s, Sultan Barak, son of Khan Tursun, stood out. It was him, and then Abylai Khan, whom the Dzungar rulers tried to win over to their side, forcing them not only to abandon their pro-Russian orientation, but also to take direct hostile action against the tsarist authorities. Although Sultan Barak was inclined to recognize Russian sovereignty, he did not swear allegiance to the imperial throne and refused invitations to come. Sarabi told the official I. Lavpin about the negotiations between the next Oirat embassy, which had arrived from the Oirat army that had gone to Samarkand. While the sultan was holding a celebration in honor of the arrival of the ambassadors, the Oirats tried to stir up anti-Russian sentiments: "The Russians have taken the Zengortsy people on the Irtysh, and they have taken possession of your lands on the Yaik rivers... and then they will not leave, so that there will be no place for them in the nomadic camps, and so what do you think, we will not give up what is ours, and what they have built on the Irtysh, we will destroy... either this winter or next spring.“ In response, Barak told the Dzungars that the Kazakhs ”have no grievances or objections to the Russians building fortresses on the Yaik River or to the Russians themselves, but rather they are pleased, because they are always satisfied with their trade.". As for attacking Russian fortresses, “it is not difficult to conceive, but it would be difficult to accomplish, for it is not easy to engage in such an undertaking with the Russians.”^[100]

In 1744, relations between the Middle and Junior jüz improved, trade began, fairly frequent political contacts were established, and the issue of prisoner exchange was resolved peacefully. Abylai and Galdan Tseren also maintained close ties.^[101]

According to Oirat merchants in Russia, the total number of Kazakh amanats in Galdan Tseren's camp was 30 people. In the spring of 1744, Abulfeiz, the son of Sultan Barak Shigai, arrived to replace Abilmambet's son. As a symbolic tribute, Kazakh khans and sultans sent huntaiji dogs and eagles. In addition, certain representatives of the tribal nobility began to receive letters of privilege. One of those awarded was Abilay's companion, the famous biy and batyr from the Basentin clan of the Argyn Malaysary tribe.^[102]

The Kazakh nomads of the Middle Zhuz came close to the borders of the Dzungar Khanate.^[103]

In the summer of 1745, Galdats-Tseren suddenly demanded that one of the three owners—Abulmambet, Abylai, or Barak—come to his headquarters. Alarmed by this news, on August 20, Abylai went to Abulmambet, but upon learning that embassies from Russia were on their way to him, he returned. On August 27, Captain S. Volkov arrived at Abylai's camp with Cossacks from Lieutenant General G. H. Kinderman. After that, Abylai sent Sary-batyr to Abulmambet's headquarters with instructions that Barak Sultan “or others of noble birth sent by him” should come. Sources do not say why Galdan-Tseren demanded the arrival of one of these owners as a hostage, but it is very likely that, given the dispatch of virtually the entire Dzungar army in the summer, except for a small guard, to Central Asia, Huyntayji was thus trying to prevent a possible attack by Kazakh troops on his deserted uluses. Numerous requests and appeals from the Dzungar Khanate for assistance in subjugating the Central Asian possessions were also rejected; the owners of the Middle and Junior Zhuz responded with a decisive refusal.^[c][104]

In a short time, relations between the Middle and Junior Zhuzes and the Dzungar Khanate stabilized. The Dzungarian khan also used trade to attract the people and rulers of the Middle Zhuz. Nomads who came to trade in the Orsk fortress reported that "the Zengor owner of the Middle Horde cares greatly about them and sends his merchants to the Russians to buy goods, and they sell them to the Kyrgyz [Kazakhs] without any profit in order to win the Kyrgyz's affection and lure them to themselves".^[105]

As early as 1744, Kazakhs began infiltrating the territory of Dzungaria, where Lieutenant A. Levashov reported in a journal that the uluses of the Kazakh elder Khoja Berdy Batura were nomadizing in the Tsar-Gurban area.^[105]

However, despite military successes and strong diplomatic pressure, all kinds of promises and threats by Galdan Tseren only achieved the cessation of attacks by Kazakh troops on the border nomads of the Dzungar Khanate, as well as the establishment of trade and economic ties. The relationship between the Middle Zhuz and the Dzungar Khanate should be viewed as independent, albeit differing in strength and power, feudal states. Between 1738 and 1742, about 400 sultans and other influential figures of the Middle and Junior Zhuz recognized their allegiance to the Russian Empire. As a result, the invasion of Kazakhstan by the Oirat feudal lords and attempts to prevent this process failed.^[106]

During the entire period of the Kazakh–Dzungar wars, the Dzungars fought on two fronts. In the west, they waged an aggressive occupational war against the Kazakhs, and in the east as well with the Qing Dynasty. The Kazakhs also fought on several fronts in which from the east with Dzungaria, the west where they were disturbed by Yaik Cossacks, Kalmyks and Bashkirs supported by Russia who constantly raided the border, and from the south against the states of Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva.^[107]

After the death of the Galdan Tseren in 1745 which caused an internal strife and civil war, by the struggle of candidates for the main throne and the disputes by the ruling elite of Dzungaria, one of whose representatives, Amursana, called for Chinese troops. As a result, the Dzungar Khanate fell. Its territory was surrounded by two Manchurian armies, numbering more than half a million people along with auxiliary troops from conquered people. Abylai chose not to take sides. He sheltered Amursana and Dawachi before from attacks by the Dzungar khong taishi Lama Dorji. However, once Amursana and Dawachi were no longer allies, Abylai Khan took the opportunity to capture herds and territory from the Dzungars. More than 70%–80% of the population of Dzungaria who were mostly women, old people, and children killed by the Qing army. About ten thousand families of Dzungars, Dorbets, and Khoids, led by the Noyan and Tsereng, fought hard and went to the Volga of the Kalmyk principality. Some Dzungars made their way to Afghanistan, Badakhshan, and Bukhara who accepted military services by local rulers with their descendants eventually converting to Islam.^[108]

In 1771, the Kalmyks under the leadership of Ubashi-noyon embarked on a journey back to the territory of Dzungaria, hoping to revive their national state. This historic event is known as Torgutsky Escape or "Dusty Trek".^{[109][110][111]}

• Nomad, a 2005 Kazakh historical epic film that fictionalizes account Abylai Khan's youth.
• Myn Bala, a 2011 Kazakh historical drama film set in 1729 during a war between the Kazakhs and the Dzungar Khanate.

• Dzungar Khanate
• Kazakh Khanate
• Kalmyk Khanate
• Dzungar–Qing Wars
• First Kazakh-Qing War
• Battle of Shiderty
• Xinjiang under Qing rule
• Qing dynasty in Inner Asia

• Erofeeva, Irina (2007). Khan Abulkhair: Commander, Ruler, Politician. Almaty: Daik-Press. p. 456. ISBN 978-9965-798-64-1.

• Erofeeva, Irina (2014). The epistolary heritage of the Kazakh ruling elite. 1675–1821 (PDF). Almaty: AO "ABDI Company". p. 696.

• Kadyrbayev, A. Sh. (2023). "On the History of Relations between the Volga Kalmyks and the Oirats of Dzungaria with the Nogais, Turkmens, and Kazakhs in the 17th–18th Centuries". Bulletin of Kalmyk University. 3 (59): 6–16. doi:10.53315/1995-0713-2023-59-3-6-16.

• Kushkumbayev, A. K. (2001). The Military Affairs of the Kazakhs in the 17th–18th Centuries. Almaty: Daik-Press. p. 182. ISBN 9965-441-44-8.

• Moiseev, Vladimir (1991). K. A. Pishchulina (ed.). The Dzungar Khanate and the Kazakhs (17th–18th Centuries). Alma-Ata: Gylym; Institute of Uighur Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR. p. 238.

• Suleimenov, Ramazan; Moiseev, Vladimir (1988). From the History of Kazakhstan in the 18th Century (on the External and Internal Policy of Ablai) (in Russian). Alma-Ata: Nauka; Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography named after Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR. p. 144. Archived from the original on 2024-12-08.