Battle of the Ialomița

The Battle of the Ialomița was fought between the army of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in 1442, John Hunyadi defeated the army of Şehabeddin Pasha, the Provincial Governor of Rumelia, at the Ialomița River.

The Ottoman advance that began in 1438 was halted at the Siege of Belgrade in 1440,^[10] which castle was regarded as the southern gate of the Hungarian Kingdom.^[11] While Turkish raids into the Kingdom of Hungary continued intermittently over the following years, up until the crushing defeats of Ottomans in several battles in 1442.^[10] In the year of 1442, John Hunyadi won four victories against the Ottomans, two of which were decisive. This reversed the dominance of the war party at the Ottoman court in Edirne, particularly when its most ardent supporter, Şehabeddin Pasha himself was defeated.^[2]

After the battle, the name of Hunyadi became famous and generally respected in the Christian world and became feared by the entire Ottoman Empire.^[1] This was the first time a European army had defeated such a large Ottoman force, composed not only of raiders but also of provincial cavalry led by their own sanjak beys and accompanied by formidable janissaries.^[9]

The victory of John Hunyadi against Şehabeddin Pasha and a large Ottoman army was his greatest battlefield victory,^[9][6] and his second greatest military accomplishment after the defense battle during the Siege of Belgrade in 1456.^[9]

The battle between Hunyadi and Mezid Bey within the Kingdom of Hungary: Older historiography places it at Szeben in Transylvania,^[5][12][13] while modern historiography locates the battle at the Iron Gate Pass (Vaskapu in Hungarian) in Hunyad county in southwestern Transylvania.^{[14][2][15][6][7][8]}

The battle between Hunyadi and Şehabeddin Pasha: Older historiography places it at the Iron Gate Pass in Transylvania,^[1] while modern historiography locates the battle at the Ialomița River in Wallachia.^[6][3][7][8] The exact location is still a matter of much debate among historians.^[6] American historian John Jefferson suggests a battlefield on the Danube near the modern town of Călărași in southern Romania.^[2][9][6]

King Sigismund of Hungary (reigned 1387–1437) pursued an effective, decades-long, fundamentally defensive policy in the Hungarian–Ottoman Wars.^[14] Following the defeat at Nicopolis in 1396, King Sigismund developed a new defense strategy. He aimed to create a buffer zone along the border between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, and also strengthened the existing system of banates on the southern border, which was closely linked to the developing system of border fortresses.^[16]

King Sigismund ordered Franko Tallóci, John Ország, and John Marczaly to lead a contingent of Hungarian, Polish, and Czech soldiers in a raid against Turkish territory in the summer of 1437. Ali Bey, the marcher lord of Vidin, assembled an Ottoman force to pursue and attack the Hungarian raiders. Due in part to the valiant and decisive actions of Franko Tallóci, the Ottoman force was routed, and the Hungarians pursued the retreating Ottomans, inflicting casualties where possible. The raid on Kruševac was the largest and most successful Hungarian incursion in many years. It penetrated more than 100 kilometers into enemy territory, inflicted multiple defeats, and crippled the Ottoman river fleet. The raid had two significant consequences. First, it marked the first major offensive undertaken by the Hungarians in years, demonstrating the potential effectiveness of such operations. Second, it provoked the anger of the Sultan at a time when other factors were already pushing the Ottomans toward the annexation of Serbia and the conquest of Hungary. Six months after the Kruševac raid, Sigismund died.^[17]

In late 1437, after the death of King Sigismund, Sultan Murad II addressed his court:^[18]

Who from among my subjects knows the roads of Hungary?...My sultan! Hungary is a most glorious kingdom and befits you. Is it not shameful that an infidel should be lord of this kingdom?

The Ottomans became aware of the Transylvanian peasant revolt in 1437, a fact which made the region an even more attractive target for the large-scale expedition of the following year. Ali Bey, possibly driven by a desire for revenge after his defeat near Smederevo that summer, launched a raid into Transylvania during the winter of 1437–1438, aiming to gather intelligence about the region.^[19]

In 1438, Sultan Murad II personally led the largest raid on Hungary in living memory,^[20] an Ottoman expedition in Transylvania.^[21] The Ottoman invasion ravaged southeastern Hungary for 45 days, during which the Ottomans faced little resistance, except at Szeben (now Sibiu, Romania), where the resistance of citizens caused significant Ottoman casualties.^[19]

Between 1438 and 1440, the Ottoman Empire pursued a comprehensive strategy aimed at expanding its influence and territorial control in the Balkans and Central Europe. This approach involved the annexation and incorporation of buffer states such as Serbia, followed by efforts to bring Wallachia under direct Ottoman control. Simultaneously, the Ottomans launched repeated raids into Transylvania and other regions of the Kingdom of Hungary. These incursions were intended not only to weaken Hungarian resistance but also to divert Hungarian resources and attention, thereby preventing effective support for Serbia or Wallachia. A central objective of this strategy was the capture of key fortresses, particularly Nándorfehérvár (now Belgrade, Serbia), which could serve as a strategic base for further operations into Hungarian territory and assist in overcoming the natural defensive barrier posed by the Danube River. Following the anticipated seizure of Belgrade, the Ottomans planned to initiate a broader campaign aimed at the conquest of Hungary, with the ultimate goal of annexing at least a portion of the Hungarian Kingdom into the Ottoman realm.^[19]

Between 1438 and 1440, the Kingdom of Hungary experienced the most intense period of Ottoman raids in its history, both in terms of size and frequency. In the winter of 1439 to 1440 alone, two large raids were carried out against the kingdom. In just one of these, 7,000 prisoners were seized. According to Petrus de Alla, a Franciscan monk who resided in Edirne as chaplain to the local Italian merchant community, approximately 160,000 Christians had been enslaved since early 1438.^[22]

[Between June 1439 and May 1440] The mujahedeen crossed the river into the kingdom of Hungary five times in boats. They raided, sated themselves with ample plunder, smashed their idols and their crosses, ravaged their homes and palaces, scorched their countryside and villas, suppressed their images and engravings, and reduced their castles stone by stone as they fell upon their heads.

The Janissary Corps were a formidable elite infantry units that formed the Ottoman sultan's household troops, they were the first modern standing army, and perhaps the first infantry force in the world to be equipped with firearms, adopted during the reign of Murad II. The Slaves of the Porte (janissaries) comprised the disciplined core of the sultan’s army and they fought in most of the major campaigns from 1440–1444. The slave system during this period is considered one of the key factors contributing to Ottoman-Hungarian hostilities. In addition to economic incentives, military objectives were also a driving force. Ottoman territorial expansion required a continuous supply of soldiers, which in turn necessitated the recruitment of new manpower. Raids and invasions carried out between 1437 and 1441 all resulted in the seizure of massive numbers of slaves, many of which eventually became Slaves of the Porte (janissaries). Although the process of indoctrination and training of these captives took years, these campaigns simultaneously weakened the Kingdom of Hungary and strengthened the Ottoman military. Contemporary Ottoman and Christian sources indicate that especially high numbers of captives were taken during the campaigns of 1438–1439.^[23] In Transylvania in 1455 there were still many cities and towns that were abandoned and had not yet recovered from the raids of 1438–1439.^[23]

As the "key to the realm", the castle of Nándorfehérvár (now Belgrade, Serbia) was the biggest and most fortified border stronghold of Hungary,^[24] regarded as the southern gate of the Hungarian Kingdom.^[11] In 1440, the Ottomans under Sultan Murad II laid siege to Belgrade, the most important Hungarian border fortress in the south, but they had to lift the siege after seven months due to the stiff resistance of the Hungarian garrison and the approaching winter season.^[6] This situation, combined with an ongoing civil war over the Hungarian royal succession, suggests that an Ottoman victory in 1440 could very likely have led to the collapse of the kingdom shortly thereafter. Despite this, many Hungarian nobles remained more concerned with the outcome of the internal conflict than with the threat posed by the Ottomans.^[10]

The Ottoman advance that began in 1438 was halted at the Siege of Belgrade in 1440, the last offensive campaign against Hungary personally led by Sultan Murad II. A second attempt to capture Belgrade was not undertaken until 1456, well after the Fall of Constantinople in 1453. Following the failed siege, Murad appears to have abandoned the idea of conquering Hungary through a direct assault on Belgrade. Instead, he redirected his focus toward Wallachia and Transylvania. His broader strategy was to use these lands as a springboard to conquer Hungary from the east, thereby bypassing Belgrade altogether.^[10]

John Hunyadi was appointed Ban of Szörény in 1439. Hunyadi, together with Nicholas Újlaki, annihilated the troops of the opponents of King Vladislaus I at Bátaszék at the very beginning of 1441.^[25][26] Their victory effectively put an end to the Hungarian civil war.^[25] The grateful king appointed Hunyadi and his comrade joint Voivodes of Transylvania and Counts of the Székelys in February.^[26][25] Hunyadi also became Chief Captain of Nándorfehérvár (now Belgrade, Serbia) and the ispán (head) of several southern counties of the Kingdom of Hungary, assuming responsibility for the defense of the frontiers.^[27][26] John Hunyadi immediately advocated for an offensive, anti-Ottoman strategy after taking control of the southern frontiers.^[14] In 1441, as reaction to the Ottoman occupation of Novo Brdo in southern Serbia, Hunyadi began to make raids on the Ottoman countryside in Serbia, the operation of Hunyadi aimed to devastate the area in the same manner as Turkish raiders typically did. Hunyadi was on his way back to Belgrade when his path was blocked by the troops of Ishak Bey.^[15] By the Battle of Smederevo he defeated Ishak Bey, the commander of Smederovo.^{[15][8][6][4]} Hunyadi pursued Ishak Bey and his men all the way to the gates of Smederovo, killing and capturing as many of the enemy as possible along the way.^[28]

The Sultan was upset by the defeat of Ishak Bey and ordered a massive raid against Hungary.^[6] The Hungarian court was informed about the planned Ottoman invasion of March in 1442. Hunyadi had the responsibility for the defense of the southern frontiers. Hunyadi co-voivode Nicholas Újlaki was in Pozsony (now Bratislava, Slovakia). Before the anticipated Ottoman attack, Hunyadi mobilized the forces of the entire southeastern defensive section.^[14] The Ottoman raid was set to take place in the early spring of 1442 with 16,000 akinji cavalry raiders under the command of the experienced marcher lord Mezid Bey.^{[6][14][2][15]} The forces of Mezid Bey pillaged southern and central Transylvania in March 1442.^[14][6] They defeated the army of John Hunyadi and Bishop György Lépes in a battle on 18 March.^[6] But the Ottoman army was ultimately defeated by John Hunyadi in a decisive battle on 22 March at the Iron Gate Pass (Vaskapu in Hungarian) in southwestern Transylvania.^[6][7] The Ottoman losses were heavy, Hunyadi recovered the stolen loot. The Marcher Lord of Nicopolis, Mezid Bey died, along with his son and the majority of his men.^[2][6][15] According to older historiography, John Hunyadi defeated Mezid Bey and the raiding Ottoman army at Szeben (now Sibiu, Romania) in the south part of the Kingdom of Hungary in Transylvania.^[12]

Hunyadi was encamped with his troops around Temesvár (now Timișoara, Romania), prepared to intervene wherever his presence might be required. His late arrival in Transylvania, and the consequent defeat of the local army, which resulted in the death of the Bishop of Transylvania, was explained by the fact that the Ottomans had also launched an attack on Slavonia, compelling Hunyadi to wait until the second Ottoman army had moved westward.^[14]

According to the viewpoint of classic historiography, Transylvania was caught by surprise by the Ottoman attack. Voivode John Hunyadi had only recently arrived in the region before the raid and, together with the bishop of Transylvania, György Lépes, hastily gathered an army and charged at the Turks. However, they were defeated near Gyulafehérvár (now Alba Iulia, Romania), the bishop was killed on the battlefield, and Hunyadi was wounded. However, Hunyadi, without hesitation, called the people of the province to arms – nobles, Székelys, and peasants alike – and just five days later, he delivered a decisive defeat to the Turkish army. However, according to historian Tamás Pálosfalvi, Hunyadi was not present at this first battle, which took place in Marosszentimre (now Sântimbru, Romania). The Thuróczy chronicle preserved the information that Hunyadi arrived in Transylvania only directly before the first battle. The credibility of this information is reinforced by the fact that, according to a charter issued by King Vladislaus I of Hungary, the first clash occurred unexpectedly. According to Pálosfalvi, the battle could not have been unforeseen if Hunyadi had already been in Transylvania awaiting the Turkish attack. The wounded Hunyadi likely had little opportunity, in just four days, to meaningfully replenish his battle-weary army and launch a surprise attack on the retreating Turks, who were undoubtedly made more cautious by their own losses. Also, in just four days, no meaningful mobilization could have been carried out, let alone catching up with the retreating Turkish army.^[14]

According to Pálosfalvi, the location of Hunyadi's subsequent victory over the retreating Mezid Bey was the Vaskapu (Iron Gate) in Hunyad County, the location of the victorious battle has already been convincingly identified by Ottokár Székely near the Iron Gate in southwestern Transylvania. This identification is supported by a letter written by Hunyadi himself a few years later, under similar circumstances. This conclusion is supported by numerous contemporary documents, however, according to Pálosfalvi, unfortunately, some authors continue to rely on the incorrect claims of earlier historiography.^[14]

Hunyadi pursued the Ottomans beyond Hungary's borders, and the Hungarian army penetrated into Wallachia.^[12][15] The lightning campaign of Hunyadi aimed to punish the Wallachian voivode, who was accused of cooperating with the Turks in their raid on Transylvania. Hunyadi deposed the pro-Ottoman voivode and ordered his execution, before restoring Basarab II to power. With Hungarian influence reestablished in Wallachia, it was now reasonable to expect that the Ottomans would face greater difficulty reaching Transylvania from that direction than they had in March 1442.^[15][9]

Apart from the glorious battles led by Voivode John, bad luck accompanied the Turks everywhere, whenever one of their troops sneaked into the country through some hidden route to get booty as usual. Because Voivode John's knights, whom he ordered to protect the country, always put them to flight. Thus, all roads were closed to them to attack the land of Hungary: their spears could not even flash in the sunlight within the borders of the country.

By defeating Mezid Bey and launching a raid into Wallachia, Hunyadi clearly signaled that, despite the ongoing civil war in Hungary, any aggressors could expect strong resistance. However, the repeated plundering of Transylvania undoubtedly convinced him that the theater of war needed to be pushed as far from Hungary’s borders as possible. This was the campaign's immediate lesson in the context of Hunyadi's anti-Ottoman strategy.^[14]

News of the dramatic defeat of Mezid Bey caused upheaval in the Ottoman court. Hunyadi's victory had also resulted in the loss of Ottoman suzerainty over Wallachia.^[9] Just as the Hungarian raid on Kruševac had provoked a large-scale Ottoman invasion of Transylvania in 1438, so Hunyadi's incursion into Ottoman territory had to be answered in kind.^[2] The defeat of Mezid Bey in Transylvania and the surrender of the Wallachian voivode incited Sultan Murad II for revenge, he decided a general, large-scale retaliatory campaign against the Kingdom of Hungary for the following year, which he personally intended to lead. In order to immediately avenge the defection of the Wallachian voivode and the defeat of Mezid Bey, the Sultan entrusted one of his famous lieutenant, Şehabeddin, who offered himself voluntarily for this task with great confidence,^[9][1] to punish Wallachia and Transylvania, telling him "not to dare to return before the conquest of the two territory".^[1] During these years, Şehabeddin ranked second in influence at the Ottoman court, surpassed only by Halil Pasha, who remained firmly entrenched in his position as Grand Vizier. Şehabeddin held not only the title of Vizier but also served as Beylerbey of Rumelia. He sought to use the authority of this key military post to maintain and advance the momentum of Ottoman expansion.^[2]

Murad, the emperor of the Turks was deep in thought, often recalling the many defeats of his people and the large-scale destruction of his people, as well as the fact that the territories of Moldavia and Wallachia and their rulers were broke away from him. He was very indignant on this and determined to take revenge on those who had offended him. Therefore, he gathered eighty thousand warriors from the selected military of his country, the most noble in martial virtues. He made the pasha their leader, who was second only to him in managing the country's military affairs. He ordered him to rush Wallachia as soon as possible and ravage it, since their voivode had separated from him. He should then lead his troops from here to the Transylvanian parts of Hungary and impose the harshest possible punishment with fire and sword, and take the most merciless revenge for all the insults committed by Voivode John.

The number of the Ottoman army was unanimously reported to be 80,000 according to the old writers,^[1] such as Thuróczy in the Chronica Hungarorum and Bonfini in the Rerum Hungaricarum Decades.^[1][15] According to Pálosfalvi, although Şehabeddin was able to muster regular troops and even janissaries alongside the irregular cavalry – likely a necessary response to the losses Mezid's army had suffered six months earlier – the extremely large figures reported in contemporary charters and subsequently repeated by later chroniclers are exaggerated.^[15] As Beylerbey of Rumelia (Provincial Governor of Rumelia) and Ottoman vizier, Şehabeddin was able to command significantly more military resources than Mezid Bey. Apart from the akinji, who numbered well over 10,000 cavalrymen, he gathered a total of 16 sanjak beys (governors), representing just over half of the provincial Ottoman cavalry force. He also brought along between 2,000 and 4,000 janissaries. According to the contemporary Ottoman historian Oruç Bey, there were 2,000 janissaries, 15,000 akinji, and 16 sanjak beys. In the Annals of Murad II, there were 3,000 janissaries and 16 sanjak beys present. Contemporary Byzantine historian, Chalkokondyles writes that a total of 4,000 janissaries marched with Şehabeddin.^[9] This large army took several months to assemble, and Şehabeddin was unable to set out until the end of the summer of 1442.^[9]

Şehabeddin's principal goal must have been to reestablish Ottoman control over Wallachia.^[15] An Ottoman envoy was heading to the Hungarian royal court, while Şehabeddin penetrated Wallachia.^[9] Upon arriving in Buda, the envoy engaged in discussions regarding the possibility of a treaty with the Hungarian king.^[9][15] He mentioned that the Ottomans had gathered a grand army and were advancing, fully prepared to avenge Mezid Bey's earlier defeat. In Wallachia, Şehabeddin's purpose was to punish the Wallachians for their disloyalty, secure their continued allegiance to the Ottomans, and make an impressive show of force that would turn negotiations with the Hungarians in Buda in the favor of Ottomans.^[9]

Meanwhile, Hunyadi had been informed of the coming assault and had already made preparations.^[9] Hunyadi was able to gather his forces in Transylvania.^[15]

The Ottoman army crossed the Danube in the second half of the summer of 1442, and the akinjis began the systematic devastation of Wallachia, following the traditional procedure applied against disobedient vassals,^[15] Şehabeddin caused enormous destruction in Wallachia.^[1] Şehabeddin led his troops into Târgoviște, and the Wallachian capital was seized and burned. After removing Basarab II and ensuring the submission and allegiance of Mircea II, Şehabeddin left the city and set up camp. He then released the raiders to plunder Wallachia, and perhaps parts of Transylvania as well.^[9] Not considering resistance advisable, the Wallachians retreated to the mountains.^[1][9][15] The Vlachs had ensured that the Ottomans would not discover any food in their land, fully aware that the Turks would never attack them in the mountains. For over a week they waited in the hills while the Ottomans ravaged and plundered the countryside.^[9]

Some Christian sources claim that Şehabeddin also intended to conquer Transylvania and sent raiders there. However, there is no independent evidence supporting this, although some later chroniclers mention such raids. Jean de Wavrin suggests that only the borders of Transylvania were targeted. It is also possible that Şehabeddin was instructed not to conduct raids deep into Transylvania due to ongoing peace negotiations in Buda, as such actions could undermine a potential treaty.^[9]

Hunyadi likely hoped to exploit the pasha’s weakened position, as he had previously done in his victory over Mezid Bey.^[9] The janissaries, along with the provincial cavalry, were intended to defend his camp and prevent him from meeting a fate similar to that of Mezid Bey. According to Jean de Wavrin, they dug a fortified position around Şehabeddin's camp each night, complete with stakes, trenches, and a ring of camels. For this reason, Hunyadi chose not to attack the pasha's camp.^[9] Approximately a week after releasing the akinji, the last of the raiders arrived, prompting Şehabeddin to break camp. At this point, Hunyadi began to pursue the Ottomans from a safe distance, concealing his strength and waiting patiently for an opportunity.^[9] The patience of Hunyadi paid off. According to Ottoman sources, Şehabeddin became overconfident, much like Mezid Bey had, and was unaware of the size and proximity of the Hungarian army pursuing him.^[9][15]

After the destruction of Wallachia, Şehabeddin gathered his army and prepared to march into Transylvania, bragging and boasting that at the mere sight of his turban, the cowardly enemy would run away from him at a distance of several days.^[1][30] Şehabeddin was overconfident just as Mezid Bey.^[31][9]

When John Hunyadi who was the Voivode of Transylvania and the Count of the Székelys learned the appearance of the Ottoman army in Wallachia, he immediately carried the bloody sword around in Transylvania, calling the gathering of the Székely and Hungarian armies around Szeben. This was the ancient Hungarian custom when the Hungarian king called to war, the bloody sword was carried across the realm. The gathered army of Hunyadi consisted about 15,000 experienced troops together with the units of Nicholas Újlaki who also was the Transylvanian joint voivode of Hunyadi.^[1]

In the next month in July, Şehabeddin did not go into Transylvania towards Szeben (now Sibiu) or Brasov (now Brașov) through the southern Transylvanian border mountains, because the Vlach soldiers retreated to these mountains and it was also easier for the large number of Turkish army to march through the Banate of Szörény into Hungarian territory towards Orsova and Karánsebes (now Orșova and Caransebeș) in order to intrude through the Iron Gate Gorge into Transylvania.^[1][31] Hunyadi learned by his spies that the Ottoman army did not go towards Szeben but towards Orsova, he decided to stop the penetrating Ottomans into the Kingdom of Hungary at the Iron Gate,^[1] which was a mountain pass between Transylvania and Banat (Temesköz in Hungarian) in Hunyad county.^[29] When Şehabeddin's army arrived in the south regions of Hungary at Karánsebes, he launched raiding detachments in the direction of Temesvár (now Timișoara), Lugos (now Lugoj) and the Iron Gate and they immediately began to devastate the countryside. The main Ottoman army advanced towards the Iron Gate, the army of Hunyadi followed them unnoticed along the surrounding mountains. Part of the Hungarian army suddenly descended from the mountains to stand in the way of the enemy at front of the Iron Gate. This surprised Şehabeddin and he made his entrenched camp in front of the narrow entrance to the Iron Gate Gorge instead of continuing his advance. Hunyadi also established his camp, both sides considered that setting their armies in battle order and preparing them adequately is necessary before the decisive clash.^[1]

Antonio Bonfini was commissioned to write the history of the Hungarians by King Matthias of Hungary in 1488, he used witnesses to describe the battle. According to Bonfini, Hunyadi mainly relied on his heavy cavalry, he divided them proportionally between the two wings and the middle-ward of the army. He placed the light cavalry in front and the side of the wings. He set slinger horsemen behind the wings, he placed his heavy infantry in the middle between the slingers, and spearmen and archers stood up as a reserve behind the heavy infantry. The war wagons with light infantry were placed in a long line slightly behind on both side of the army at the foot of the mountains.^[1] Earlier, Hunyadi studied the Hussites' tactics, he applied its featuring elements, including the use of wagons as a mobile fortress.^[32]<^[33] On the Ottoman side, the heavy cavalry stood in the center in two, or even more battle lines, and the janissaries stood on both sides of them, while the light cavalry sipahis were placed to the two wings.^[1]

The exact circumstances of the battle, which took place on 2 or 6 September, and the events that preceded it, are as obscure as most of Hunyadi's early wars against the Ottomans.^[15]

Bonfini asserts that the battle was fought near the border of Transylvania, while the contemporary but rather confused narrative of Wavrin suggests that the retreating Ottomans were attacked while in the process of crossing the Danube. Additionally, the charter of Vladislaus I from 1443 states that at least as many fleeing Turks drowned as were slain in the battle.^[15]

According to Jefferson, the battle took place on the Danube. Şehabeddin chose to begin disembarking his troops across the river into Ottoman territory. There were no bridges over the Danube, and, as Wavrin writes, the men were forced to cross in boats, with their horses swimming across. Considering the army's large size and the considerable amount of plunder, the crossing was likely slow and challenging. Şehabeddin's lack of caution therefore seems even more significant. Once a large portion of the army had crossed, Hunyadi decided it was time to initiate the attack. On the morning of 2 September, Hunyadi unleashed his forces on the pasha and the remainder of his army, which was still camped on the north side of the Danube.^[9]

The battle with these Ottoman forces, who despite their reduced numbers still represented a formidable threat, continued into the night. At this point, Şehabeddin acknowledged his defeat, and despite of the sanjak beys to remain and fight, he crossed the river under cover of darkness.^[9] With the pasha and his men taking priority, the timariot cavalry (sipahi, professional cavalrymen in the Ottoman army) under the command of the sanjak beys were most exposed to enemy attacks on the far side, which continued through the night as the soldiers attempted to cross. All accounts focus on this group as suffering the heaviest casualties. Some Ottoman sources report that all 16 sanjak beys were killed, representing around half of the sanjak beys in the empire. As several sources note, as many soldiers died in the waters as on the field of battle.^[9] According to a chronicle from Messembria, the Ottomans lost 28,000 troops in this battle.^[9]

According to Pálosfalvi, although Bonfini, writing almost half a century later, provides a very detailed description of the battle, the battle order he attributes to Hunyadi matches more closely the conditions of the late 15th century, particularly those of King Matthias's mercenary forces.^[15]

Hunyadi opened the battle with the advance of the middle-ward of his army as a wedge battle formation in order to break the Ottoman line, but the heavy Ottoman cavalry, supported by the janissaries, successfully held the first attack of the Hungarian army. Şehabeddin ordered his janissaries to attack the center army of Hunyadi forming a semi-circle against the advancing wedge formation of the Hungarians in order to break and cut away them from the flanks. He also ordered the sipahis to make a hard attack, and they pushed back the Hungarian light cavalry on the wings. Hunyadi recognized the danger and he pulled back his center army group towards the narrowing mouth of the valley, where his weakened wings received sufficient protection on the steep valley sides, there he reorganized the battle order of his army. The Ottomans already considered themselves victorious and rushed after the Hungarians.^[1]

The Hungarian heavy cavalary in middle-ward of Hunyadi's army hold the line in the valley, meantime the war wagons suddenly appeared along valley edges and supported the light infantry who ambushed the Ottomans on the wings from the mountains. This sudden unexpected counter-attack confused the Ottoman army and Şehabeddin, who had no time and place to sufficiently unfold his army which was crowded in the narrow valley. In these circumstances, Hunyadi ordered his heavy cavalry on the center to attack again, which lead the Ottoman army into a catastrophic situation because it was surrounded on three sides. The Ottoman units at the front seeking shelter from the sabers of the Hungarian heavy cavalry pushed back those who are behind. This also caused the disintegration of the further back Ottoman battle lines, and the crowded Ottoman units behind did not know what happen at the front. At the same time, the Hungarian light cavalry also attacked on both sides of the Ottomans together with the war wagons. The war wagon usage deeply impressed the Ottomans which was unusual and novelty for them. The Ottoman troops became confused by this pressure and they started to flee, however they did not find shelter. The heavy cavalry of Hunyadi constantly pushed the Ottoman units at the front cutting down this pressed human mass in a narrow space, who also crushed each other. The Hungarian light infantry and the war wagons slaughtered the Ottomans on the two wings and finally the light Hungarian cavalry chased the fleeing Turks. Therefore almost half of the Ottoman army perished on the battlefield, and only the other half was able to cross the Danube river again to reach the Ottoman territory.^[1] The Hungarians took 5,000 prisoners and 200 flags.^[1]

We see Hunyadi ’s abilities in this regard at the Battle of Battaszek , where he used scouts to determine the enemy army’s composition and location. Based on this information he was able to achieve complete sur prise and successfully defeat Garai ’s numerically superior forces. He employed the same tactic against Ishak Bey in 1441, Mezid Bey in early 1442 and most dramatically against Şehabeddin later that same year.^[34]

The Hungarian forces seized substantial plunder. In his haste to retreat, Şehabeddin abandoned the majority of his camp's possessions, which reportedly included 5,000 camels and an uncountable number of horses.^[9]

At the time of Hunyadi's victory, negotiations for a possible Hungarian–Ottoman peace were still ongoing in Hungarian capital Buda. King Vladislaus I received the Ottoman emissary in a formal audience, attended by Cardinal Cesarini, along with the prelates and barons of both of his kingdoms. The Ottoman emissary stated that the sultan was inclined toward peace and proposed either the cession of Belgrade or the payment of tribute in exchange for a lasting peace. Both King Vladislaus I and the Royal Diet rejected the offer. Unaware of recently-occurring events, the envoy issued a threatening warning, that without agreement, otherwise the Ottomans would capture many more fortresses within two years. Soon after the ambassador's audience with the king, news of Şehabeddin’s defeat reached the court at Buda. With the balance of power shifted, the Ottoman envoy had no choice but to depart the Hungarian capital and report that peace with the Hungarians was no longer a possibility. The Ottomans now had to prepare for war.^[9]

After the victory over Şehabeddin Pasha, exploiting the confusion in the Ottoman ranks, Hunyadi invaded Bulgaria, burned the town of Vidin.^[15][9] Hunyadi's forces burned the ships used by the Ottomans to transport troops across the Danube and pillaged the estates of the akinji and marcher lords.^[9] Then Hunyadi advanced westward to join forces with Újlaki and the Thallócis, whose territories remained under threat from Ottoman raiders. Upon arriving in southwestern Hungary, Hunyadi and his troops launched further military operations into Ottoman-held areas near Nándorfehérvár (now Belgrade, Serbia), aiming to exact retribution for Ottoman incursions into Slavonia earlier that year.^[9] Hunyadi returned with a significant booty and a large number of liberated Christians.^[15]

Since 1441, Hunyadi had adopted the Turkish policy of responding to each incursion with an equal or greater reprisal. He began to see the benefits of this approach.^[9]

The Ottomans, upon hearing of the defeat and the significant losses of men, decided to lift their siege of Constantinople.^[9] The victory over Şehabeddin resulted in more than heavy casualties and a loss of morale for the Ottomans. For the Ottomans, military victories in offensive operations were also a means to fund further campaigns. Plunder was the primary source of income for akinji raiders, while captives provided both wealth and recruits for the Porte's slave army. This created an incentive to fight in future campaigns and helped equip and expand their armies. Hunyadi reversed this dynamic, forcing the Ottomans into defensive campaigns over the next two years, at great expense to the empire.^[9] The Christian threat prompted the enemies of the Porte to act, emboldening many to revolt within the Ottoman Empire. All of this was precisely what Halil Pasha had warned against. Şehabeddin was disgraced and removed from the office of beylerbey and replaced by Kasım Pasha. Nevertheless, he remained as vizier, allowing him to participate in the battles of the following year and partially restore his reputation.^[9]

The victory of John Hunyadi against Şehabeddin Pasha and a large Ottoman army was his greatest battlefield victory,^[9][6] and his second greatest military accomplishment after the defense battle during the Siege of Belgrade in 1456.^[9] Through extensive intelligence and reconnaissance, advanced strategic planning, and swift and sudden action, Hunyadi was able to execute complex operations and force the enemy to fight on terms most favorable to his army.^[9]

The successes of Hunyadi in 1442 were celebrated throughout Europe, especially his victory over Şehabeddin. This was the first time a European army had defeated such a large Ottoman force, composed not only of raiders but also of provincial cavalry led by their own sanjak beys and accompanied by formidable janissaries.^[9] The pope was ecstatic, and even members of the conciliar party rejoiced. To honor the victory, the Venetians held a grand procession led by the doge, while the Florentines staged their own celebrations. The Duke of Burgundy ordered a crusade sermon from his confessor, followed by a procession in Dijon.^[9]

In the year of 1442, John Hunyadi won four victories against the Ottomans, two of which were decisive.^[2] In March 1442, Hunyadi defeated Mezid Bey and the raiding Ottoman army in the south part of the Kingdom of Hungary in Transylvania.^[2] These victories made Hunyadi a prominent enemy of the Ottomans and a renowned figure throughout Christendom and were prime motivators for him to undertake along with King Władysław the famous expedition known as the "Long Campaign" in 1443, with the Battle of Niš being the first major clash of this expedition. Hunyadi was accompanied by Giuliano Cesarini during the campaign.^[35][2]

• Babinger, Franz (1978). Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-09900-6.
• Cartledge, Bryan (2011). The Will to Survive: A History of Hungary. C. Hurst & Co. ISBN 978-1-84904-112-6.
• Engel, Pál (2001). The Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526. I.B. Tauris Publishers. ISBN 1-86064-061-3.
• Jefferson, John (2012). The Holy Wars of King Wladislas and Sultan Murad: The Ottoman-Christian Conflict from 1438–1444. Leiden: Brill Publishers. ISBN 978-90-04-21904-5.
• Mureșanu, Camil (2021). John Hunyadi Defender of Christendom. Las Vegas: The Center for Romanian Studies, Histria Books. ISBN 978-1-59211-012-4.
• Pálosfalvi, Tamás (2018). From Nicopolis to Mohács: A History of Ottoman-Hungarian Warfare, 1389–1526. The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage: Politics, Society and Economy 63. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-37565-9.
• Teke, Zsuzsa (1980). Hunyadi János és kora [John Hunyadi and his Times] (in Hungarian). Gondolat. ISBN 963-280-951-3.
• Turnbull, Stephen (2003). The Ottoman Empire 1326–1699. Essential Histories. New York, London: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781841765693.