Badissia novembria

Badissia-Novembria^[1][2](Arabic: باديسية نوفمبرية) is a political movement, Arabist, neo-Baathist, Islamist, and anti-Kabyle, that emerged in Algeria in 2019 during the Hirak protests. Badissia-Novembria is composed of a patchwork of conservative ideas, bringing together proponents of Arabo-Islamism and pan-Arabism who are openly opposed to democratic, secular, and progressive movements, and who deny the Amazigh dimension of the Algerian people.

The option of a fifth term for President Bouteflika was defeated in the face of popular mobilization at the beginning of 2019. Several debates then swept through society, drawing on historical references to legitimize the various political discourses of the time.^[1] The Badissia-Novembria movement, for its part, was led by a conservative minority within the population, most often marginalized within the popular marches of the Hirak.^[3]

The Badissia-Novembria movement, for its part, claims to unite the ideals of the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema (Islamist-conservative, autonomist, and legalistic during the French colonial period) and those of the Declaration of November 1, 1954 (revolutionary, armed nationalist...). This historical contradiction is, in fact, raised by critics of the Badissia-Novembria movement, who point out that the FLN, which launched the Algerian War on November 1, 1954, was not aligned with the teachings of Ibn Badis. In this sense, Badissia-Novembria practices a form of pro-Islamist revisionism.^[4] This movement also opposes the values ​​of the Soummam conference (democratic and social state...)^[1].

The movement also targets the Algerian Constitution during its 2020 revision, and more specifically Article 4, which makes Tamazight a national and official language since 2016. It thus hopes for a reversal on the issue of identity.^[5] The promoters of Badissia-Novembria share some similarities with the European far right, the latter structuring its discourse around immigrants, while Badissia-Novembria structures its discourse around chauvinism and racism that targets Kabyles.^[6][7][8]Its supporters also see themselves as defenders of an Algerian state viewed as (solely) "Arab, Novemberian, and Badissian" against the "enemies of the ummah."^[6] Many of those responsible for the Badissia-Novembria have been prosecuted by the Algerian judiciary.

The Badissia-Novembria movement emerged in April 2019, a few weeks after the start of the Algerian Hirak. It was driven by a conservative segment of the population, often marginalized within the popular marches, and comprised in part of an elite, frequently Arabic-speaking: journalists and historians with some public profile, and infiltrators within the "system" who shared a common vision: to drastically simplify national history by confining it to a monolithic narrative centered on an Arab-Islamic identity and claiming a dual heritage—that of Abdelhamid Ben Badis's religious reformism and Algerian nationalism. Among the first to embrace it were Islamist groups, including Hamas, through the pronouncements of its two leaders, Abderrazak Makri^[9] and Aboudjerra Soltani. These were followed by figures within the government, including Mohamed Djemaï, Secretary General of the FLN.^[10][11]

They carry well-made placards bearing the portraits of Larbi Ben M'hidi and Amirouche Aït Hamouda. Some participants tried to convince Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi to lead a transition, but when he refused, they left the marches. This movement is particularly prevalent among students at the Institute of History and is promoted in the media.^[6]

According to sociologist Nacer Djabi,^[2] the Badissia-Novembria, an expression of “latent nationalism,” is the product of the collision of two disparate realities. Referring to Abdelhamid Ben Badis, founder in 1931 of the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema, and his followers, the term badissia evokes a reformist religious movement that placed Islam and the Arabic language at the heart of national identity without, however, supporting the November 1954 national uprising against French colonization.^[12] Furthermore, badissi originally referred to a follower of Ben Badis who forbade his wife from visiting the mausoleums of Sufi saints.^[6] Novembria, on the other hand, refers to the November 1954 national uprising, legitimizing the armed struggle. The two terms "badissia" and "novambaria" thus express oxymoronic visions of the national question. Supporters of this movement march with photos of Abdelhamid Ben Badis (historical leader of the ulema) and Larbi Ben M'hidi (one of the figures of the Algerian War), side by side during the Hirak.^[12]

The principle of "civilian primacy over the military", enacted at the Soummam conference in 1956, is one of the main slogans, massively claimed during the popular marches of the Hirak under the Arabic slogan "dawla madania mashi 'askaria" (in English: Civil state and not military) in direct confrontation with another new slogan, Badissia-novembria, which seeks to re-establish the power of the military, embodied at the time by the Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaïd Salah, over the civilian, with the endorsement of reformist Islamists, "moderates" sensitive to the idea of ​​an alliance that would free them from their historical counter-revolutionary identity.^[2]

In this one-dimensional view, the primary target of the Badissia Novembriya movement is the Amazigh cultural, historical, identity-based, and linguistic dimension. It is caricatured, demonized, and above all, suspected of separatism. The rise of Islamists on the Amazigh issue follows the Hirak movement, during which the former army chief of staff, who died in December 2019, launched a veritable witch hunt against those carrying the Amazigh flag during demonstrations. Dozens of flag bearers were arrested by the security services and sentenced to prison terms after the movement lost momentum. Ahmed Gaïd Salah thus seemed to encourage the increasingly brazen attacks on Amazigh identity.^[10] This has led to the unexpected emergence of the Badissia-Novembria movement and an anti-Kabyle hate speech.^[8]

The supporters of Badissia-Novembria reject or fight against the Amazigh flag, which they call "rayat al-farchitta", the "fork flag." It is structured around various political figures, including the Society for Peace movement (also known by its Arabic acronym "Hamas": Harakat Mujtama'a al-Silm).^[13] The Badissia-Novembria movement is involved in a policy of denigrating France. It advocates replacing French with English.^[14]

Relayed by various Algerian private media outlets, this hate speech targets Algerian Kabyles, exposing them to racist insults and incitement to violence from Islamist figures such as Naïma Salhi. The "Zero Kabyle operation" calls for the ethnic cleansing or imprisonment of Kabyle political leaders, reflecting a broader hostility among extremist circles towards Amazigh communities. It took place during a meeting in Sidi Lakhdar near Mostaganem on August 8, 19, and 20, 2019. These extremist positions stand in stark contrast to the popular mobilizations of the Hirak movement, where slogans were written in the spoken languages: Tamazight and Algerian Arabic, demonstrating unity that transcended linguistic, identity-based, and regional "boundaries".^[15]

Salah Goudjil, president of the Council of the Nation (Senate) since April 2019, has repeatedly criticized the Badissia-Novembria: "When people say November is Badissi, they are lying to history. November is November, it belongs to no one." He is supported in this by the Council of the Nation.^[11][16]

Similarly, in 2023, Nordine Aït-Hamouda (former member of parliament), two years after his release from prison in 2021, spoke of "the great Badissia-Novembria hoax." He criticized those who wanted to prevent the development of Tamazight, despite the Constitution establishing it as a national and official language. He argued that "it is not insignificant that most of the online influencers are Islamist and beholden to fundamentalist groups." He called on Algerians to fight the Badissia-Novembria hoax.^[17]

This current distorts and alters the history of the struggle for national independence. It associates the outbreak of the Algerian War on November 1, 1954, with the Islamic reformist movement of Ben Badis, whereas the latter's followers played a marginal role during the early years of the armed struggle (November 1954 – January 1956). Conversely, the Kabyles provided many of the key figures among the main initiators of the National Liberation Front (FLN).^[13]

This ideology has been amplified through television channels and social media, where anonymous, sometimes well-structured, accounts disseminate intolerant and even hateful rhetoric with complete impunity. Faced with this escalation, institutions remain lax, allowing this discourse to become entrenched in public debate; far from being marginal, it gains in audience due to the lack of opposing viewpoints or sanctions.^[10]

• Some officials who held positions during the terms of former President Bouteflika and who were close to the movement have been charged by the Algerian justice system. These include Generals Abdelhamid Ghriss, Secretary General of the Ministry of National Defense from September 2018 to March 2021, and Wassini Bouazza, head of the Coordination of Algerian Security Services from April 2019 to April 2020, who are believed to belong to the Badissia-Novembria movement^[18][12][19]. In July 2021, an article in El Watan mentioned a direct link between this movement and high-ranking officers of the People's National Army, during legal proceedings concerning Abdelhamid Ghriss, who was arrested for—notwithstanding allegations of corruption—being a "key player" in the "electronic warfare" conducted under the Badissia-Novembria banner^[12]. Wassini Bouazza is even believed to be behind the “Zero Kabyle operation", dubbed “The Meeting of Conscience”. He was sentenced to 16 years in prison and fined 500,000 DZD.^[20]
• Mohamed El-Amine Belghit, a history professor, is notorious for his attacks on the Amazigh language and the memory of Kabylia. A revisionist and reactionary, he disputes the essential role played by this region in the war of liberation, going so far as to disparage the Soummam Congress and the commitment of its leading figures, including Abane Ramdane. In the media, Mohamed Amine Belghit defines Tamazight as a "product of a Franco-Zionist conspiracy." On May 3, 2025, he was remanded in custody, charged with "undermining national unity" and "inciting racial hatred" after making these controversial remarks on Sky News Arabia, an Emirati channel.^[10][7] In July 2025, he was sentenced to five years in prison for "undermining national unity."^[21] On December 15, 2025, he was pardoned by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune.^[22]
• Abdelkader Bengrina, president of the El-Bina movement and close to the Badissia-Novembaria current, does not condemn the statements of Mohamed Amine Belghit and asks President Abdelmadjid Tebboune to obtain his freedom.^[23]
• Naima Salhi, another prominent figure in this discourse, is a former member of parliament and the Islamist president of the small Equity and Proclamation Party (PEP). In November 2022, she was sentenced to two six-month prison terms for "incitement to racial hatred" and "undermining national unity." She was also prosecuted for "incitement to murder" against Kabylia.^[24][25][26] During her trial in October 2022, she defended herself against these accusations, claiming that the word "zouave" was aimed at the MAK movement.^[27] In 2017, she had already gained notoriety in a video where she stated that she would "slit the throat" of her daughter if she spoke Tamazight.^[26]
• Noureddine Khettal, journalist and activist, is supporter of the Badissia-Novembria movement.^[28] A complaint was filed in September 2020 by the family of Lounès Matoub through the foundation bearing the singer's name; two complaints were also filed for other accusations: "damage to the memory of Lounès Matoub," and "defamation and false accusations" .^[10][29]

In June 2019, in the media outlet El Watan, sociologist Nacer Djabi argued that the Badissia-Novembria ideology promotes a "backward nationalism" and aligns with the European far right. Rabah Lounici, a history researcher, believes that members of the Algerian authorities are orchestrating the promotion of Badissia-Novembria.^[30]

In a September 2023 article entitled "The Maghreb in the Grip of Identity Fever," Le Monde, notes similarities between the Algerian Badissia-Novembria movement, the Moroccan Moorish movement, and the positioning of Tunisian president Kaïs Saïed. Le Monde journalists question "the emergence of a far right politics in the Maghreb," but this notion is primarily characterized by its Eurocentrism. According to academic Karima Dirèche, "It is rather a matter of exacerbated nationalisms that can become ultra-exclusive in their rejection of any form of otherness." Publisher Amar Ingrachen, for his part, believes that the Algerian state "outsources the management of society to this Arab-Islamic orthodoxy, which dictates its law in all areas, particularly culture and education."^[12]