Alexandre Galopin

Alexandre Galopin, born on 26 September 1879 in Ghent and assassinated at his home in Etterbeek on 28 February 1944, had been governor of the Société Générale de Belgique, since March 1935, a major Belgian company, and chairman of the board of the motor and armaments company Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre (FN).

He is regarded as a prominent figure of Belgian business leadership in the first half of the 20th century.

A civil engineer by training, and head of the general management of the “Fabrique Nationale” (FN) in Herstal (Liège) before 1914, he plays a crucial role in Paris during the First World War, in the standardized production of armaments—chiefly rifles—for the French and Belgian armies.

As an economic adviser to the Belgian government at the end of the war, he takes part in preparing and implementing the policy for reviving Belgian industry after 1918.

In 1919, he is among the Belgian experts involved in the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles, which brings an end to the First World War. He represents the Belgian central bank at the “Banque des Règlements Internationaux” (BRI), established in 1930 in Basel.

Galopin is renowned for his role during the Second World War as head of the “Comité Galopin”, entrusted on 15 May 1940 with a “mission of confidence” by the Belgian government shortly before its departure for England. In this capacity, he plays a central part in shaping the economic and financial policy of occupied Belgium in the face of the Nazi regime.

In February 1944, Governor Galopin is assassinated at the request of Himmler, head of the SS.

After 1945, the decisions taken by Alexandre Galopin and his circle under Nazi occupation become the subject of judicial and historiographical debate.

Alexandre Galopin was born in Ghent, East Flanders in Belgium on 28 September 1879. Galopin comes from an intellectual family; his father having served first as professor of civil law and later as rector of the State University of Liège. There, he pursues studies in civil engineering, which he completes with distinction in 1902, before adding further training in Berlin, London, and Paris. He speaks both English and German ^[1].

Returning to Liège in 1904, he joins the “Fabrique Nationale d’Armes de Guerre” (FN), where, at his own request, he spends two years working alongside the labour force as a machine-tool fitter and industrial draughtsman. From the outset of his career, Galopin shows sensitivity to the workers’ conditions. He distinguishes himself through his organizational talents and equips FN with a state-of-the-art laboratory. In 1913, he becomes the company’s general director.

On the eve of the outbreak of war, FN produces not only hunting rifles but also weapons of war, ammunition, bicycles, motorcycles, automobiles, and trucks. Galopin plays a central role in this industrial diversification ^[2].

The German invasion of Belgium beginning on 2 August 1914 quickly places the Liège region at the mercy of the invader. Because of the strategic nature of the production, the FN board of directors decides to halt operations and close the factories. The German occupier places FN under sequestration and transfers its machine tools to German arsenals ^[1].

Galopin goes to Antwerp, where the Belgian army is regrouping and establishing a national stronghold. He then moves on to Le Havre, the city where the Belgian government has settled, and places himself at its disposal.

Meanwhile, the French government designates the socialist Albert Thomas as the organizer of military equipment production. Named Deputy Secretary of State for Artillery and Ammunition, he negotiates with the Belgian Prime Minister Charles de Broqueville the assignment of Galopin for the benefit of the French war effort. In exchange for the delivery of 15,000 rifles to the Belgian army stationed on the Yser, the Belgian government agrees to it ^[3].

Minister Thomas entrusts Galopin with the coordination of all light armament production by the French factories scattered across the country. Drawing inspiration from Taylorism, a North American method in vogue in the 1900s, Galopin implements a rigorous standardization of rifle part machining among the various factories, requiring only final assembly work. The “Galopin method” greatly increases productivity and makes it possible to deliver, within short deadlines, the essential armaments needed at the front. Galopin is then entrusted, with the support of Winston Churchill (British Minister of Munitions in 1917–1918), with applying the same method to the production of machine gun parts. And, from 1917, Galopin is entrusted with the mission of standardizing the production of aircraft engines ^[2].

At the end of the conflict, Alexandre Galopin is decorated with the Legion of Honour by the French government in recognition of his services.

International negotiations: the Treaty of Versailles and the “Banque des Règlements Internationaux” (BRI)

At the end of the war, Galopin actively participates in the ‘Consultative Committee’ created in October 1917 in Paris by the Minister of Economic Affairs, Paul Hymans, who is responsible for planning Belgium’s post-war economic policy and preparing the peace negotiations ^[4].

Appointed to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul Hymans calls on Galopin to join the Belgian delegation at the peace conference sitting in Versailles in 1919.

Galopin involves himself in economic and financial matters, notably concerning the Belgian reparations to be claimed from defeated Germany.

As Regent of the “Banque Nationale de Belgique” (BNB), Galopin takes part in the meetings of the “Banque des Règlements Internationaux” (BRI) in Basel, which in the 1930s becomes a forum for consultation among central banks .

Belgium was invaded by Nazi Germany on 10 May 1940. At the start of the German occupation, Galopin was made chairman of an informal group, dubbed the "Galopin Committee", which convened senior figures in Belgian economic life, notably representatives of major holding companies, banks, and industry. The committee had been set up by the Belgian government, shortly before it left the country, on 15 May 1940.^[5][6][7] It served as a sort of a Belgian shadow government in the occupied territory that decided a common stance on economic and social issues and was able to set rules for dealing with the German administration. The committee included politicians and businessmen:

• Max-Léo Gérard, banker and chairman of the Banque de Bruxelles
• Fernand Collin, banker and chairman of Kredietbank
• Raymond Vaxelaire, head of the Au Bon Marché department store chain
• Willy de Munck, Chairman of the Générale de Banque
• Albert Goffin, official at the National Bank of Belgium and, from 1941, its governor
• Léon Bekaert, industrialist^[5]
• Albert-Edouard Janssen, Chairman of the Société Générale de Belgique and former finance minister^[5]
• Paul Tschoffen, Catholic Party ex-minister and lawyer
• Emile van Dievoet, Catholic Party ex-minister and law professor

Because of his power and influence within the Belgian wartime economy, Galopin was nicknamed "the Uncrowned King of Belgium" by German occupation officials.^[8]

Part of the goal of the Galopin committee was to keep Belgian industry strong during the war to avoid leaving the economy crippled once the war ended. To that end, Galopin gave his name to a controversial policy known as the "Galopin doctrine" (Doctrine Galopin). Under that plan, Belgian companies should continue production under German occupation provided that they were producing goods for Belgium's civilian population (such as food or consumer goods) even if it would benefit the German war industry by relieving it from the need to export similar goods. However, Belgian companies should refuse to produce war materiel or goods that were directly usable in the German war effort.^[9]

The aim of the policy was to prevent a repeat of the economic destruction which had accompanied the German occupation of Belgium during World War I, when workers and businessmen had been encouraged to resist German demands. That had led to the deportation of Belgian workers to Germany in 1916 and the confiscation of capital from firms, which was also sent to Germany. The policy had, in turn, caused unemployment and inflation that continued to damage the Belgian economy for years after the war.^[10] Limited co-operation with the German occupiers in non-military production was hoped to limit the war's effects on the Belgian economy and to facilitate post-war economic recovery. It was therefore an extension of a similar policy of "lesser evil" (moindre mal) adopted by Belgian civil servants through the Committee of Secretaries-General. Initially, it was also supported by the Belgian government in exile.

In practice, the distinction between the limited co-operation in the Galopin doctrine and outright collaboration proved difficult to maintain. It was widely perceived as a form of collaborationism in the Belgian population.^[11] After some initial acceptance, in 1941 and 1942, German officers began to force Belgian businessmen to disapply the distinction at the risk of personal punishment and the confiscation of their businesses.^[12] In 1942, the occupation administration began to deport Belgian workers as forced labourers in Germany as during World War I. However, it has been argued that the co-operative approach represented by the doctrine did prevent German companies from expanding their control over the Belgian economy.^[13]

The Galopin doctrine was similar to the policy of "co-operation" (samenwerken) in the German-occupied Netherlands and overseen by senior civil servants such as Hans Hirschfeld.^[14]

Galopin was assassinated in 1944 by members of Devlag, a radical pro-Nazi paramilitary group active in Flanders, under direct orders from Robert Jan Verbelen.^[15] Galopin's name has been given to a street: avenue Alexandre Galopin in Etterbeek, Brussels.

• Committee of Secretaries-General
• Social Pact
• Strike of the 100,000

• Van den Wijngaert, Mark; Dujardin, Vincent (2006). La Belgique sans Roi, 1940–1950. Vol. 2. Brussels: Éd. Complexe. ISBN 2-8048-0078-4. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
• Mazower, Mark (2008). Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (1st ed.). London: Allen Lane. ISBN 978-0-713-99681-4.
• Mommen, André (2002). The Belgian Economy in the Twentieth Century. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-203-40348-8.
• La Société Générale de Belgique, 1822–1972. Brussels: Société Générale. 1972.
• Grosbois, Thierry (2007). "Les relations avec la Belgique occupée". Pierlot, 1930-1950 (in French). Lannoo Uitgeverij. ISBN 978-2-87386-485-9.
• Nefors, Patrick (2006). "La reprise industrielle (mai - septembre 1940)". La collaboration industrielle en Belgique, 1940-1945 (in French). Lannoo Uitgeverij. ISBN 978-2-87386-479-8.
• Gildea, Robert; Wieviorka, Olivier; Warring, Anette (2006). Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe. Berg. ISBN 978-1-84520-181-4.
• "Galopin, Alexandre Marie Albert". Biographie Belge d'Outremer (PDF) (in French). Vol. IV. Royal Academy for Overseas Sciences. 1968. p. 383.

• Van den Wijngaert, Mark (1990). L'Économie belge sous l'Occupation: La Politique d'Alexandre Galopin, Gouverneur de la Société Générale (PDF) (in French). Paris: Duculot. ISBN 9782801109441. Archived from the original (PDF) on 1 February 2014. Retrieved 18 January 2014.
• Luyten, D. (1994). "De "opdracht" van de regering aan het Galopin-Komitee op 15 mei 1940". Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog. 16 (1): 163–172.