Željko Komšić

Željko Komšić
Komšić in 2025
12th Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Incumbent
Assumed office
16 July 2025
Preceded byŽeljka Cvijanović
In office
16 July 2023 – 16 March 2024
Preceded byŽeljka Cvijanović
Succeeded byDenis Bećirović
In office
20 July 2021 – 20 March 2022
Preceded byMilorad Dodik
Succeeded byŠefik Džaferović
In office
20 July 2019 – 20 March 2020
Preceded byMilorad Dodik
Succeeded byŠefik Džaferović
In office
10 July 2013 – 10 March 2014
Preceded byNebojša Radmanović
Succeeded byBakir Izetbegović
In office
10 July 2011 – 10 March 2012
Preceded byNebojša Radmanović
Succeeded byBakir Izetbegović
In office
6 July 2009 – 6 March 2010
Preceded byNebojša Radmanović
Succeeded byHaris Silajdžić
In office
6 July 2007 – 6 March 2008
Preceded byNebojša Radmanović
Succeeded byHaris Silajdžić
6th Croat Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Incumbent
Assumed office
20 November 2018
Prime MinisterDenis Zvizdić
Zoran Tegeltija
Borjana Krišto
Preceded byDragan Čović
In office
6 November 2006 – 17 November 2014
Prime MinisterAdnan Terzić
Nikola Špirić
Vjekoslav Bevanda
Preceded byIvo Miro Jović
Succeeded byDragan Čović
Parliamentary offices
Member of the House of Representatives
In office
9 December 2014 – 20 November 2018
Additional positions
President of the Democratic Front
Incumbent
Assumed office
7 April 2013
Preceded byOffice established
Personal details
Born (1964-01-20) 20 January 1964
Sarajevo, SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, SFR Yugoslavia
PartyDemocratic Front (2013–present)
Other political
affiliations		Social Democratic Party (1997–2012)
Spouse
Sabina Komšić
​
(m. 1996)​
Children1
Education
Awards Order of the Golden Lily
Military service
Allegiance Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Branch/serviceArmy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Years of service1992–1996
RankPlatoon leader
Unit
Battles/warsBosnian War

Željko Komšić (Croatian pronunciation: [ˈʒɛːʎkɔ ˈkɔmʃitɕ]; born 20 January 1964) is a Bosnian Croat politician serving as the 6th and current Croat member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2018, having served from 2006 to 2014 as well. He has also been serving as chairman of the Presidency since July 2025. Previously, he was a member of the national House of Representatives from 2014 to 2018.

Born in 1964, Komšić earned a degree in law from the University of Sarajevo in 1988, and later attended a specialization program at Georgetown University. He served in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Bosnian War, and was awarded with the Order of the Golden Lily. Following the war, Komšić worked at the Federal Ministry of Displaced Persons and Refugees, before being elected municipal mayor of Novo Sarajevo in 2000. He then served as the Bosnian ambassador to FR Yugoslavia. In the 2006 general election, Komšić successfully ran for a seat in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the Croat member. He was re-elected to the office in the 2010 election. Komšić was a prominent figure of the Social Democratic Party, until he left it in 2012 to establish the Democratic Front a year later. Following the end of his term in the Presidency, he was elected to the national House of Representatives in the 2014 election.

Komšić was elected to the Presidency for a third term in the 2018 general election. He was re-elected for a fourth term in the 2022 general election, and has since then become the longest-serving Presidency member overall. He is also the only one to have served more than two terms.

Although elected to the post of Croat member of the tri-partitive Presidency, many Bosnian Croats consider Komšić to be an illegitimate representative of their interests as he was elected mainly by Bosniak voters in the Federation,[1] a Bosniak-Croat political entity which forms a majority of the country's territory and whose residents are eligible to cast ballots for both the Bosniak and Croat members of the Presidency (while the Serb member is elected by residents of the Republika Srpska entity). His legitimacy has been widely contested among the Bosnian Croat population during his third and fourth terms in particular.

Early life and education

Komšić was born on 20 January 1964 in Sarajevo to Bosnian Croat father Marko Komšić and Bosnian Serb mother Danica Stanić (1941 – 1 August 1992). His mother was killed by a sniper of the Army of Republika Srpska as she sipped coffee in her apartment during the siege of Sarajevo.[2] According to many, this event was his breaking point, as at the time, he was enlisted in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Komšić would go on to earn the Order of the Golden Lily, which was at the time the highest state order awarded for military merits.[3]

Komšić has a Bachelor of Laws degree from the Faculty of Law of the University of Sarajevo. He also attended the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and was chosen to represent Bosnia and Herzegovina in the selective annual Georgetown Leadership Seminar in 2003.[4][5]

Early political career

After the war, Komšić embarked on a political career as a member of the Social Democratic Party (SDP BiH). He was a councilman of the municipality of Novo Sarajevo and in the city council of Sarajevo, before being elected the head of the municipal government of Novo Sarajevo in 2000. He then also served as the deputy mayor of Sarajevo for two years. When the "Alliance for Democratic Change" coalition came to power after the 2000 parliamentary election, Komšić was named the ambassador to the now defunct FR Yugoslavia in Belgrade. He resigned this commission after the 2002 general election when the SDP BiH went back into opposition.

First presidency (2006–2014)

2006 general election

Main article: 2006 Bosnian general election

Komšić was the SDP BiH's candidate for the Croat seat in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 2006 Bosnian general election. He received 116,062 votes, or 39.6%[6] ahead of Ivo Miro Jović (HDZ BiH; 26.1%), Božo Ljubić (HDZ 1990; 18.2%), Mladen Ivanković-Lijanović (NSRzB; 8.5%), Zvonko Jurišić (HSP; 6.9%) and Irena Javor-Korjenić (0.7%).[6] He was sworn into office on 6 November 2006.

Komšić's victory was widely attributed to a split in the HDZ BiH party, enabling the SDP BiH to win a majority of the Bosniaks votes. Croats saw Komšić as an illegitimate representative of the Bosnian Croats because he was elected mostly by Bosniak voters.[1] Croat leaders and Catholic Church figures urged Komšić to relinquish the seat, framing it as an illegitimate circumvention of ethnic quotas designed to protect minority interests amid Bosnia and Herzegovina's fragile power-sharing framework, though legal challenges did not overturn the certified results.[7] Nonetheless, Komšić and the other two members of the presidency were sworn in on 6 November.

2010 general election

Main article: 2010 Bosnian general election

In the 2010 general election, Komšić was re-elected with 337,065 votes, 60.6% of total. He was followed by Borjana Krišto (HDZ BiH; 19.7%), Martin Raguž (HK; 10.8%), Jerko Ivanković Lijanović (NSRzB; 8.1%), Pero Galić (0.3%), Mile Kutle (0.2%) and Ferdo Galić (0.2%).[8]

Komšić's electoral win in 2010 was highly contested by Croat political representatives and generally seen as electoral fraud. Namely, every citizen in the Federation can decide whether to vote for a Bosniak or a Croat representative. However, since Bosniaks make up 70% of Federation's population and Croats only 22%, a candidate running to represent Croats in the Presidency can be effectively elected even without a majority among the Croat community - if enough Bosniak voters decide to vote on a Croat ballot. This happened in 2006 and in 2010, when Komšić, an ethnic Croat, backed by the multiethnic Social Democratic Party, won the elections with very few Croat votes.[9][10]

In 2010, Komšić didn't win in a single municipality that had Croat-majority or plurality; nearly all of these went to Borjana Krišto. The bulk of the votes Komšić received came from predominantly Bosniak areas and he fared quite poorly in Croat municipalities, supported by less than 2,5% of the electorate in a number of municipalities in Western Herzegovina, such as Široki Brijeg, Ljubuški, Čitluk, Posušje and Tomislavgrad, while not being able to gain not even 10% in a number of others.[11] Komšić received over seven thousand votes from the Bosniak-majority municipality Kalesija, where a total of 20 Croats live. Furthermore, total Croat population in whole of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was then estimated around 495,000;[12]

Komšić received 337,065 votes alone, while all the other Croat candidates won 219,046 votes altogether. After the election, Croats considered him to be an illegitimate representative and generally treated him as a second Bosniak member of the presidency.[13][14][15][16] This raised frustration among Croats, undermined their trust in federal institutions and empowered claims for their own entity or a federal unit.[17]

Tenure

Collaboration within the Presidency proved challenging, marked by frequent deadlocks between Komšić and Serb member Nebojša Radmanović, who often aligned with Republika Srpska's separatist-leaning positions, and varying alignments with Bosniak members Haris Silajdžić (2006–2010) and Bakir Izetbegović (2010–2014). These tensions stemmed from fundamental disagreements over centralizing state institutions, reforming electoral laws, and countering entity-level obstructions to national decision-making, resulting in stalled initiatives on constitutional amendments and EU accession prerequisites.[18]

In May 2008, Silajdžić stated during his visit to Washington, D.C. that there is only one language in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that it goes by three names. His statement created negative reactions from Croat political parties and, at the time, Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik. Komšić replied to Silajdžić that he was not the one who would "decide how many languages are being spoken in Bosnia and Herzegovina."[19]

According to a study conducted by the National Democratic Institute in 2010, Komšić was the most popular politician among the Bosniaks.[20]

Komšić's ideological approach drew support from non-nationalist voters, but criticism from Croat parties viewing it as undermining constituent people protections. Toward the end of his second term, internal party strife culminated in Komšić's departure from the SDP BiH in July 2012, triggered by disagreements over proposed constitutional changes that he claimed sidelined his input on civic reforms.[21] He and other dissidents subsequently formed the Democratic Front (DF) in April 2013 as a platform for anti-corruption and civic unification efforts.[22] The DF operates predominantly among Bosniak and pro-Bosnian voters in the Federation, and is characterized as a unitary, social democratic, and civic-nationalist center-left party.

Second presidency (2018–present)

2018 general election

Main article: 2018 Bosnian general election

Komšić announced his candidacy in the Bosnian general election on 11 January 2018, running once again for Bosnia's three-person Presidency member, as the Croat member of the Presidency.[23] In the general election, held on 7 October 2018, he was again elected to the Presidency, having obtained 52.64% of the vote. The incumbent Bosnian Croat presidency member, Dragan Čović, was second with 36.14%.[24]

Komšić's win reignited longstanding controversies over the legitimacy of ethnic representation in the Presidency, as his electoral base was predominantly Bosniak voters in the Federation rather than a majority from Croat communities. Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, who endorsed the incumbent Čović, criticized Komšić's victory: "We are again in a situation where members of one constituent people are electing a representative of another, the Croat people".[25] Komšić responded that the Croatian Government was undermining Bosnia and Herzegovina and its sovereignty.[26]

Protests against Komšić's election drew thousands in Croat-stronghold cities including Mostar and Široki Brijeg on 11–12 October 2018, organized by Croat nationalist groups who denounced him as a "second Bosniak member" unfit to represent Croat interests.[27] Demonstrators highlighted the disparity in vote distribution, with Komšić underperforming in core Croat cantons yet prevailing due to Federation-wide tallies.[28]

As a response to Komšić's election, mayors of the Croat-majority municipalities of Čapljina, Čitluk, Grude, Livno, Posušje and Usora declared him persona non grata.[29] Additionally, the members of The Bridge in the Croatian Parliament demanded that Komšić be declared persona non grata in Croatia, but their efforts were to no avail.[30]

Tenure

In March 2019, Komšić appointed Serbian politician and businessman Čedomir Jovanović as his advisor.[31]

On 22 May 2021, Komšić and Šefik Džaferović, the Bosniak member of the Presidency, attended a military exercise between the United States Army and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina on mount Manjača, south of the city Banja Luka in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Milorad Dodik, the Presidency's Serb member, refused to attend it.[32]

In August 2021, Komšić and Džaferović, without including Dodik, instructed the Ministry of Security to be available for putting out the wildfires in Herzegovina which had formed a few days before.[33] This came after Dodik, as the third member of the Presidency, refused to give consent on the Bosnian Armed Forces to use its military helicopters to help in putting out the fires, because the consent of all three members of the Presidency is required for the military force's helicopters to be used.[34]

In November 2021, upon protests of miners over plans for job and wage cuts in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Komšić commented on the events, stating "The director of the Public Enterprise Electric Utility should resign, as soon as minister Džindić and prime minister Novalić [Fadil Novalić] resign."[35]

In the 2022 general election, Komšić was re-elected to the Presidency for a record fourth term, obtaining 55.80% of the vote. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ BiH) candidate Borjana Krišto, was second with 44.20%.[36] With his support once again deriving substantially from Bosniak-majority areas, HDZ BiH leaders contended that the outcome disenfranchised genuine Croat interests by allowing cross-ethnic bloc voting, echoing prior election disputes without successful legal annulment.[37] Komšić was sworn in as Presidency member for a fourth time on 16 November 2022, alongside newly elected members Denis Bećirović and Željka Cvijanović.[38]

Following the 2022 general election, a coalition led by the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the HDZ BiH and the liberal alliance Troika reached an agreement on the formation of a new government, designating Borjana Krišto as the new Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers.[39] The Presidency officially nominated her as chairwoman-designate on 22 December; Denis Bećirović (SDP BiH) and Željka Cvijanović (SNSD) voted for, while Komšić voted against.[40] Komšić said his reason for voting against was that "Krišto did not outline her programme as designate."[41]

COVID-19 pandemic

Main articles: COVID-19 pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina and COVID-19 vaccination in Bosnia and Herzegovina

As the COVID-19 pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina started in March 2020, the Presidency announced Armed Forces' placement of quarantine tents at the country's borders intended for Bosnian citizens returning home. Every Bosnian citizen arriving to the country was obligated to self-quarantine for 14 days starting from the day of arrival. Tents were set up on the northern border with Croatia.[42]

On 2 March 2021, Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić came to Sarajevo and met with Komšić, Džaferović and Dodik, and donated 10,000 dozes of AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines for the COVID-19 pandemic.[43] Three days later, on 5 March, Slovenian president Borut Pahor also came to Sarajevo and met with Komšić, Džaferović and Dodik, and stated that Slovenia will also donate 4,800 AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines for the pandemic.[44]

Foreign policy

In October 2018, Komšić announced that Bosnia and Herzegovina might sue Croatia over the construction of the Pelješac Bridge.[45] The construction of the bridge, paid largely with EU funding, began on 30 July 2018 to connect Croatia's territory and was supported by Komšić's main election opponent Dragan Čović.[46]

In December 2020, right before a state visit of Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, Komšić refused to attend the visit because of Lavrov's disrespect to Bosnia and Herzegovina and decision to firstly visit only Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik and later on the presidency consisting of Šefik Džaferović, Dodik and Komšić.[47] Shortly later, Džaferović too refused to attend Lavrov's visit because of the same reasons as Komšić.[48]

In September 2021, Komšić went to New York City to address the United Nations General Assembly at its headquarters.[49] There he held bilateral meetings with United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and Austrian president Alexander Van der Bellen on 21 September.[50][51] On 22 September, Komšić addressed the General Assembly, speaking about the political challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change.[52] On 23 September, he met with Montenegrin and Kosovar presidents Milo Đukanović and Vjosa Osmani.[53] In November 2021, Komšić attended the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference, where he was welcomed by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and UN Secretary-General António Guterres.[54]

On 17 January 2022, he met with Pope Francis in Vatican City.[55] Following their meeting, Francis praised Komšić, saying that "he is a good person."[56] On 9 February 2022, Komšić went to Madrid, where he held a bilateral meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and also spoke with King Felipe VI.[57][58]

Following Russia recognizing the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic as independent states on 21 February, which are disputed territories in the Ukrainian region of Donbas, Komšić strongly condemned "Russia’s attack on the territory of Ukraine."[59] On 24 February, Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered a large-scale invasion of Ukraine, marking a dramatic escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War that began in 2014. Regarding the invasion, Komšić said Bosnia and Herzegovina would support Ukraine within its capacity.[60]

Balkan non-papers
Main article: 2021 Balkan non-papers

In April 2021, Komšić sent a non-paper to EU foreign ministers, fiercely criticizing EU Delegations for their too good attitude towards the nationalistic Bosnian parties SNSD and the HDZ BiH. His paper focuses on Russian influence, interference of Croatia and Serbia in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the combination of relations between the HDZ BiH and the SNSD, but also criticism of the poor behavior of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[61] The same month, Komšić reacted to a supposed non-paper sent by Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša, regarding possible border changes in the Western Balkans, saying that it was "all already orchestrated and only God knows what the outcome will be."[62]

The first non-paper's plans and ideas were heavily criticized and reacted to by many political leaders from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, North Macedonia, as well as by politicians from the European Union and Russia. A second non-paper, which first appeared in Kosovo's Albanian-language media in April 2021, proposed that Serbia recognize Kosovo's independence by February 2022 and that Serb-majority North Kosovo be granted autonomy in return for Serbia's recognition.[63]

Gaza war
Main article: Gaza war

After Hamas attacked Israel in October 2023, Komšić remarked that Hamas' actions are the actions of desperate people and that their actions should be observed within a wider context. He accused the Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers Borjana Krišto for expressing her support for Israel, calling her statement "hasty and selfish".[64] Israeli ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina Galit Peleg criticised Komšić's statement and defended Krišto, to which Komšić responded by calling Israel's ambassador "a malicious lying fool or a manipulated but also malicious fool" and said "that pervert", referring to Israeli businessman Amir Gross Kabiri, "who persuaded you to this lie and stupidity, because you obviously neither looked at nor listened to my statement and to whom money is more important than the fact that earning it with the followers of the same policy and ideology that participated in the holocaust of your people, is the problem of your country."[65]

In October 2025, following the brokering of the Gaza peace plan and the start of a third ceasefire in the Gaza war, the Bosnian Presidency unanimously decided to nominate U.S. president Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize for his "commitment to establishing lasting peace in Gaza" and the Middle East.[66] This marked the first official nomination for the 2026 edition of the award.[67]

Political positions

Domestic policy

Komšić is a prominent advocate of a civic model of the state, arguing that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organized primarily around individual citizenship rather than ethnic affiliation. He has frequently criticized the constitutional and political framework established by the Dayton Peace Agreement, claiming that its system of ethnic power-sharing entrenches divisions, enables political blockades, and discriminates against citizens who do not identify with one of the three constituent peoples.[18]

Komšić supports constitutional and electoral reforms aimed at strengthening state institutions and reducing the role of ethnic veto mechanisms. His views have often placed him in opposition to ethnonationalist parties in both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[68] Economically and socially, Komšić and the Democratic Front are generally positioned on the center-left, advocating social justice, workers' rights, and a stronger role for the state in ensuring social welfare.[69]

Foreign policy

United States

See also: Bosnia and Herzegovina–United States relations

Komšić has generally supported close relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United States, viewing the U.S. as a key international partner in safeguarding the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and post-war stability.[70] He has acknowledged the role of the United States in brokering the Dayton Agreement, while also arguing that continued U.S. engagement is important for advancing democratic and constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has publicly aligned himself with U.S. policies that emphasize the strengthening of state institutions and opposition to secessionist or destabilizing political initiatives.[70]

Komšić has also expressed support for U.S. sanctions imposed on political actors accused of undermining the constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina, describing such measures as instruments for preserving peace and stability.[71] His positions have often contrasted with those of political leaders in the country who oppose NATO integration or advocate greater ethnic autonomy.

Conversely, Komšić's commentary has occasionally also included criticism of perceived shifts in U.S. policy; in a January 2024 interview, he suggested that aspects of U.S. policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina "seemed aligned with the strategic interests of Croatia rather than exclusively promoting Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutional stability."[72]

Turkey

See also: Bosnia and Herzegovina–Turkey relations

On 16 March 2021, Komšić went on a state visit to Turkey to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[73] While there, Erdoğan promised to donate Bosnia and Herzegovina 30,000 COVID-19 vaccines for the COVID-19 pandemic.[74] Also on the meeting, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey agreed on mutual recognition and exchange of driving licenses, as well as signing an agreement on cooperation in infrastructure and construction projects, which also refers to the construction of a highway from Bosnia and Herzegovina's capital Sarajevo to Serbia's capital Belgrade; the agreement being signed by Minister of Communication and Traffic Vojin Mitrović.[75]

On 27 August 2021, Erdoğan came to Sarajevo on a state visit in Bosnia and Herzegovina and met with all three Presidency members, having talks about more economic and infrastructural cooperation, as well as looking into the construction of the highway from Sarajevo to Belgrade.[76] Also, a trilateral meeting between Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was agreed on.[77]

European Union

See also: Accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union

In September 2020, Komšić and his fellow Presidency members said that an EU candidate status for Bosnia and Herzegovina was possible in the year 2021 if the country "implements successful reforms."[78]

On 30 September 2021, Komšić met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the Presidency Building in Sarajevo.[79] This was part of von der Leyen's visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina, since she some hours before opened the Svilaj border checkpoint and a bridge over the nearby Sava river, which bears the internationally important freeway Pan-European Corridor Vc.[80]

On 1 December 2021, Komšić met with German Minister of State for Europe Michael Roth, with the main topics of discussion being the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reform processes and activities on the country's EU path.[81]

In December 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised by the European Union as a candidate country for accession following the decision of the European Council, which Komšić strongly supported.[82] On 8 February 2024, the Presidency unanimously adopted the decision to start negotiations with Frontex, one of the country’s key conditions for opening negotiations with the EU.[83] On 21 March 2024, at a summit in Brussels, all 27 EU leaders, representing the European Council, unanimously agreed to open EU accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Council of Ministers adopted two more European laws.[84][85] Talks are set to begin following the impeding of more reforms.[85][86]

Immigration

In September 2023, during the seventy-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Komšić criticized aspects of international migration management, arguing that large and powerful countries "tend to attract the most educated and skilled migrants, thereby weakening the human capital base of smaller countries."[87]

LGBT+ rights

In September 2019, Komšić supported the first BIH Pride March, the LGBTQ pride parade in Sarajevo, stating that "Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country where everybody can live their life as they wish", and adding that the march "is not an ordinary, but a first-class political event."[88]

Personal life

Komšić's maternal grandfather Marijan Stanić, who was a Chetnik during World War II, died two years before Komšić was born.[89] The Stanić family hailed from the village of Kostajnica, near Doboj.[90] Komšić's paternal family hails from Kiseljak. His paternal uncle was an Ustasha who disappeared during World War II.[91] Komšić was baptised a Catholic, like his father. However, being a religious-skeptic, he left the Catholic Church. He is a self-described agnostic.[92] His wife, Sabina, is an ethnic Bosniak. The couple has a daughter named Lana.[93]

Komšić was one of the signatories of the Declaration on the Common Language for Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks and Montenegrins.[94] He is an avid supporter of Sarajevo-based football club Željezničar.[95]

On 2 July 2025, Komšić underwent a successful cardiac catheterization and had a stent implanted in Sarajevo.[96]

Orders

Award or decoration Country Awarded by Year Place
Order of the Golden Lily Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović 1995 Sarajevo

References

Citations
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  11. ^ "PREDSJEDNISTVO BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE". www.izbori.ba. Retrieved 25 May 2025.
  12. ^ "U BiH ima 48,4 posto Bošnjaka, 32,7 posto Srba i 14, 6 posto Hrvata | Avaz | Online izdanje" [In BiH there are 48.4 percent Bosniaks, 32.7 percent Serbs, and 14.6 percent Croats.]. Dnevni avaz. Archived from the original on 31 July 2014. Retrieved 25 May 2025.
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  14. ^ Vogel, T. K. (9 October 2006). "Bosnia: From the Killing Fields to the Ballot Box". The Globalist. Archived from the original on 10 October 2009. Retrieved 30 July 2012.
  15. ^ Pavić, Snježana (8 October 2010). "Nije točno da Hrvati nisu glasali za Željka Komšića, u Grudama je dobio 124 glasa" [It is not true that Croats did not vote for Željko Komšić; he received 124 votes in Grude.]. Jutarnji list (in Croatian). Retrieved 6 April 2013.
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Bibliography
  • Berglund, Sten (2013). The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 9781782545880.
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